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Introduction
There are two warring camps that stand perpetually opposed to each other in the
study of social norms: theorists who deploy a strictly rational choice model and
their critics in the law and society movement who accuse them of pointedly blotting
out the obvious in their pursuit of methodological purity.' This fundamental divide
hinges on their views regarding what Richard McAdams refers to as normative
motivations,2 and what I will refer to generally as internalization (for the sake of
simplicity I use a broad definition: the term internalization here means the under-
lying sense of universal obligation or duty to follow the norm-the "ought to"
implicit in the norm).' The rational-actor vision of human behavior where indi-
viduals seek only to maximize their self-interest seems at odds with the process
of internalization. 4
Eric Posner's Signaling theory of norms lies squarely in this rational choice
camp. It has now been ten years since Posner first proposed his signaling theory.'
It is a bold theory that sparked a flurry of debate in the law and norms literature,
some praise, mostly criticism. The core of Posner's theory is that individuals adopt
social norms in order to signal that they have a low discount rate, and are therefore
good long-term cooperative partners-in short, to show they are team players.' A
Deepest thanks to Eric Posner at the University of Chicago for his helpful advice and suggestions.
Thank you also to Neil Duxbury at the London School of Economics for reviewing an earlier draft
of the present article.
1. Robert Ellickson writes," ... the law-and-economics scholars believe that the law-and-society
group is deficient in both sophistication and rigor, and the law-and-society scholars believe that
the law-and-economics theorists are not only out of touch with reality but also short on humanity."
R.C. Ellickson, Order Without Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991) at 7.
2. Richard H. McAdams, "Signaling Discount Rates: Law, Norms, and Economic Methodology"
(2001) 110 Yale L.J. 625 at 681.
3. As Posner says, " ... people bound by [norms] feel an emotional or psychological compulsion
to obey the norms; norms have moral force." Eric A. Posner, "Law, Economics, and Inefficient
Norms" (1996) 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1697 at 1709. The literature sometimes makes a distinction
with regard to what I am here referring to broadly as internalization. For instance, Peter Huang
speaks of emotions, specifically the moralistic kind. Peter H. Huang, "Reasons Within Passions:
Affects and Attributions in Property Rights Bargaining" (2000) 79 Or. L. Rev. 435; Peter Huang
& Ho-Mou Wu, "More Order Without More Law: A Theory of Social Norms and Organizational
Cultures" (1994) 10 J. L. Econ. & Org. 390. McAdams cites the importance of the psychological
need for esteem from others in his Esteem Theory of Norms. See Richard H. McAdams, "The
Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms" (1997) 96 Mich. L. Rev. 338 at 355-57.
4. "The rational-actor model has two basic underlying tenets. It assumes, first, that each individual
pursues self-interested goals and, second, that each individual rationally chooses among various
means for achieving those goals." Ellickson, supra note 1 at 156.
5. Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).
6. Posner, supra note 5 at 24-25.
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person with a low discount rate values the future more than the present; they are
willing to forgo short-term gain to reap the rewards of sustained cooperation.
Normative behavior, be it wearing a tie on a hot day, keeping one's lawn green, or
voting, is costly in some respect. There is some transaction cost involved. This cost
is what turns norms into signals. When an individual conforms to such behaviors,
they signal their discount rate-the greater the cost, the lower the discount rate.
It is in a sense a down payment upon one's relationship, communicating one's com-
mitment. But in this world of opportunists and social charlatans, who can you really
trust? Posner explains a norm is a reliable signal insofar as high-discount rate types
are simply not willing to make the investment, and therefore will not mimic the
signal. Suppose I can gain one dollar by cheating you at the end of one day, or 100
dollars by cooperating with you for a week, if I then perform an action upfront that
costs me 7 dollars, this reliably signals my willingness to cooperate more long-
term. This will create a separating equilibrium, allowing cooperative types to iden-
tify one another; however, when the signal can be mimicked cheaply it will create
a pooling equilibrium.' Posner argues that what we call "norms" are simply the
labels we attach to the behavioral regularities of individuals emitting these signals.!
The explanatory strength of Posner's thesis is enormous; all norms can be reduced
to signals. However, the theory suffers from a fundamental limitation-its insistence
upon a purely rational choice model.' The aim of this paper is to radically expand
Posner's theory by incorporating internalization into his model.
Thus, my first task is to show how internalization is in actual fact a product of
the signaling game Posner describes. In doing so, it is my objective to bridge the
conceptual fissure between the rational choice and law and society factions. Indeed,
as we will see, it is vital to the theory of norms I will construct here to first bring
normative motivations, so marginalized by rational choice, back in from the cold.
To explain norms, we must explain their defining quality: internalization. In fact,
the question of internalization is frankly far more interesting, because it relates
implicitly to our basic sense of justice-that the law is normative and just. Here
we have the seeds of morality0 That internalization is hardly found in animals apart
from humans" seems to lend scientific credence to the notion that it is our capacity
for law that separates us from "the animals."
If our normative model can be judged to be a true reflection of how norms actu-
ally arise and function in the real world, the reality of internalization must be fully
incorporated into the model. But how can internalization and Posner's model be
reconciled? Posner's theory can be modified so it can be used to explain the process
of internalization. This is what I set out to do in this paper, positing a broader model,
7. Ibid. at 19-21.
8. Ibid. at 8.
9. Ibid. at 46.
10. Indeed, internalization lies embedded at the heart of the natural law position, and it in fact explains
the persistence of the embattled belief within jurisprudential circles.
11. Herbert Gintis, "The Hitchhiker's Guide to Altruism: Gene-culture Coevolution, and the
Internalization of Norms" (2003) 220 J. Theor. Biol. 407 at 417; see also Mark R. Leary, "Digging
Deeper: The Fundamental Nature of 'Self-Conscious' Emotions" (2004) 15 Psych. Inquiry 129
at 129.
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what I call the Expanded Signaling Model of Norms (ESM). I do this primarily
by tethering Posner's theory to an evolutionary model. My thesis is that evolution
has conditioned an instinctual proficiency in working with norms as signals in what-
ever form they take-a proficiency that manifests in an emotional context. This
trait is what we call internalization. Internalization enhances the individual's ability
to instinctively play Posner's signaling game; it confers a crucial survival advantage
and was thus selected for. The signaling game is instrumental to the ability to form
sustained cooperative relationships, and therefore to individual survival. Thus, from
an evolutionary perspective, individuals who internalized the entire process, and
as a result became more adept at playing the game, were at an advantage. The basic
supposition I am advancing here is that the internalization of discount rate signals
is an adaptive quality. The idea that internalization is evolutionarily conditioned
is not new. 2 However, linking this explicitly to Posner's theory of discount rate sig-
nals is, and doing so offers tremendous explanatory potential.
Given that internalization is fitness enhancing, there is no reason to believe that
such a trait would not be subject to selective pressures; like all traits, it too is subject
to the inescapable verity of natural selection. Natural selection bridges the divide
between rational choice and internalization, allowing for the coexistence of both.
At times a rational calculus is deployed, at others, indeed the vast majority of the
time, internalized responses predominate, allowing the entire process to play out
in an unconscious manner. Indeed, rational calculation represents only one small
sliver of normative behavior. For the most part, norm adoption precedes rational
calculation; conformity is mostly thoughtless and automatic, occurring chiefly on
an unconscious level. In a sense, the claim made here is a hybrid of the two posi-
tions: the adoption of norms is at times indeed a rational choice, but for the most
part, the process unfolds reflexively in the mind of Homo economicus. And when
it does so, it is no less "rational" from the point of view of Posner's signaling the-
ory-it is in fact likely more efficient. Granted an experienced hiker might make
the calculated decision to drink in order to stave off dehydration; but we cannot
ignore the hiker's feeling of thirst. She may at certain moments consciously choose
to drink, but the majority of the time thirst will serve as her governing motivation.
When Homo economicus responds in this manner, it redirects our attention towards,
if you will, a deeper "rationality" implicit in our social evolution.
Jon Elster asserts that norms possess a compulsive character that cannot be
explained in purely rational terms. The assumption of instrumental rationality, he
argues, is simply unable to provide a coherent explanation of social order." Thus,
he concludes, "As far as the explanation of norms is concerned, rational choice the-
ory has nothing to offer."l 4 This is not true; rational choice has much to offer,
12. Leary, ibid. ("Since Darwin ... all theories of emotion have assumed that the capacity for emo-
tional experience evolved because it had adaptive value in helping organisms deal with recurrent
challenges and opportunities in their physical and social environments." [footnotes omitted]).
13. John Scott, "Rational Choice Theory" in G. Browning, A. Halcli & F. Webster, eds.,
Understanding Contemporary Society: Theories ofthe Present (London: Sage Publications, 2000)
126 at 133.
14. Scott, ibid.
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although not at all in the way it envisions. The signaling game has a pure economic
basis. The process of internalization is thus perfect economic rationality expressed
through the winnowing process of natural selection. Indeed, in a sense, the rational
choice claim that all social action is instrumental stands-a form of individual ratio-
nality is indeed the basis for internalization. Moreover, as it relates to social norms,
the basic rational choice assumption of methodological individualism-that com-
plex social behavior can be explained in terms of elementary individual
actions-still holds." Indeed, there is a cool and predictable rationality that under-
pins the emotional chaos of internalization, and this can be of great use.
For our purposes it is very important that Posner's entire model translate into
the realm of internalization, as it is here that the entirety of this signaling game
can play out in a reflexive manner. Doing so maintains the explanatory strength
of Posner's approach, while shoring up its reductionist failings. Indeed wedding
internalization to Posner's model resolves the major criticisms leveled at his theory.
It, in a sense, completes his model. The core of Posner's theory is a powerful one.
Posner never argues, however, that signaling is the sole explanation for norms."
In responding to his critics (which are many), Posner has attempted to walk back
his theory a little, or at least clarify its limitations." However, I wish to do the exact
opposite. This paper seeks to expand Posner's model even further. Posner does not
believe the signaling game he describes is able to explain all social norms." I part
company with Posner in asserting that his signaling game, when it incorporates
internalization (as ESM does), can account for the emergence of all normative
beliefs."
Following from the proposition that evolution produces the internalization of
the signaling game, I make two addendum claims through the course of this dis-
cussion. To successfully tether Posner's theory to an evolution-based explanation,
these two sub-claims in fact must be established. First, (1) evolution does not gen-
erate the internalization of specific norms; rather, it generates the tendency to inter-
nalize any norm that functions as a signal of a discount rate. Second, (2) agents
internalize signals commensurate with their individual discount rates. The lower
an individual's discount rate, the more prone they are to internalize a given norm.
These points will be dealt with in turn.
On one level, the genius of much of the law and norm literature is that it
employs a rational choice model to explain the emergence of norms. 20 However,
15. For methodological individualism, see Jon Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) at 13; Posner, supra note 5 at 39.
16. Eric A. Posner, "Signaling Model of Social Norms: Further Thoughts" (2002) 36 U. Rich. L.
Rev. 465 at 467; see also Posner, supra note 5 at ch. 3.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. This is not to deny that some norms may arise due to their inherent survival value, or as solutions
to coordination dilemmas-but these norms are nevertheless also co-opted as signals. And their
function as signals contributes greatly to their persistence. Not all norms may start off as signals,
but all norms end that way. See infra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
20. See Robert C. Ellickson, "The Evolution of Social Norms: A Perspective from the Legal
Academy" in Michael Hechter & Karl-Dieter Opp, eds., Social Norns (New York: Russell Sage
Foundation, 2005) 35 at 36 ("The new norms scholars all hew to a rational-choice model of human
8
Law, Selfishness, and Signals
I would submit that this is ultimately its primary flaw. To the extent that the literature
discounts the significance of internalization, it is in danger of gross oversimpli-
fication. The claim that a rational choice calculus fully governs the decisions of
agents complying with norms is a fiction, albeit a useful one. It simply is not true.
It is reductionism in its crudest sense.2 This trumpeting of rational choice is an
understandable attempt to import some of the certainty of economics into a field
that unfortunately largely defies such an application.22 Rational choice theory has
a certain methodological elegance to it; it is a useful model, but when we speak
of normative behavior, it is not a full description of reality. The very essence of
a norm is that it is genuinely felt to be right, possessing a certain quasi-ethical sense.
As Elster declares, norms have a certain "grip on the mind."2 3 There is no getting
around the fact that upon seeing a person cut the line one genuinely feels it is wrong.
This indignation is not a rational choice.
This article is divided into three parts. In Part I, after providing a brief overview
of the difficulties confronting a purely rational choice approach, and arguing for
the necessity of incorporating internalization, I lay out a model of Posner's theory
that employs an evolutionary explanation of internalization. In Part II, I address
two substantive questions that arise in the wake of such a model. I first look at why
inefficient norms may still be selected for under such a model. In answering this
question, I explore the ways this approach can also be used to resolve some key
theoretical problems facing sociobiology and evolutionary psychology. I then exam-
ine a second question: why not all players evolve an equal predisposition to inter-
nalize low discount rate signals. The final conclusion this paper reaches is that
applying an evolutionary model to Posner's signaling theory of norms is not only
possible, it in fact greatly expands the explanatory reach of his theory, specifically
in that it provides a measure of clarity and predictability regarding how and why
norms are internalized-an important insight, as these beliefs form the normative
underpinning to law.
I. Internalization: Expanding Posner's Signaling Game
A. The Puzzle of 'Irrational' Norm Compliance
1. Prisoner's Dilemma
Integral to the discussion of norms is the familiar puzzle of human cooperation. The
question being: How is cooperation sustained among hopelessly self-oriented agents?
This is especially problematic for theorists who hew to a rational choice perspective.
behavior. This methodological individualism ... supposes that each individual generally is both
rational and self-interested.").
21. Though, admittedly, what I go on to contend below might be accused of being no more than a
slightly more nuanced foray into reductionism.
22. Of course, that the rational choice model is entirely safe even within the field of economics is
debatable.
23. Jon Elster, "Fairness and Norms" (2006) 73 Social Research 365 at 368.
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Cooperative ventures are invariably undermined by the persistent stain of self-interest.
When certain defection opportunities present themselves and one party is tempted
to grab a little more at the direct expense of the other party (aggravated by the fact
that one cannot be guaranteed that the other party is not contemplating the very same
thing)-defection inevitably emerges as a dominant strategy. The paradigmatic illus-
tration of this conundrum is the prisoner's dilemma, where each prisoner's optimum
strategy is to confess at their cohort's expense, no matter what their partner decides
to do.24 In the case of Prisoner Dilemma games "played only once, no strategy can
invade the strategy of pure defection ... to defect always is an evolutionarily stable
strategy."" In an isolated interaction there is no escape from this.26
The well-known solution to this dilemma, as Axelrod famously established, is
to simply make the scenario an iterated game.27 If the prisoner's dilemma is repeated,
and players value future rounds of cooperation sufficiently, conditional cooperation
may not only be sustained, indeed it can flourish. The temptation to defect is lessened
considerably by the threat of potential retaliation in later rounds and the loss of ben-
efits derived from future cooperation. Defection provokes defection in kind, whereas
cooperation will induce greater cooperation. Depending upon the value the respective
players place upon future cooperation, the benefit gleaned from future rounds of
interaction can offset any short-term advantage from immediate defection, thus
allowing for conditional cooperation to emerge as a possible equilibrium. Repeated
interaction is the solution. This is all well and good, however where there is no
repeated interaction, it becomes unclear as to why norm-compliance of any kind
that is costly and does not provide any benefit to the actor should occur at all.
2. The Tipping Tourist
Why, for example, does a tourist in a distant city quietly leave a tip on the table as
she leaves unseen from a restaurant to which she plans to never return?28 Or even
24. For those unfamiliar with game theory, McAdams provides a concise summary: " ... two prisoners,
A and B, are suspected of committing a crime together. If neither confesses, each knows they will
each be convicted of a lesser offense and serve (say) three years in prison. The prosecutor then offers
each the following deal, and each knows it is offered to the other: If you confess and the other does
not, we will let you off with only one year in prison; if the other confesses and you do not, we will
punish you with ten years in prison; if you both confess, you both will serve five years in prison.
Confessing is the dominant strategy because it is the best strategy no matter what the other prisoner
does. From A's perspective, if B confesses, A is better off confessing and getting five years instead
of ten; if B does not confess, A is better off confessing and getting one year instead of three. The
reasoning is the same for B." McAdams, supm note 2 at 628; see also Bryan Druzin, "Law Without
the State: The Theory of High Engagement and the Emergence of Spontaneous Legal Order within
Commercial Systems" (2010) 41 Geo. J. Int'l L. I at 559, 599-605.
25. Robert Axelrod & William D. Hamilton, "The Evolution of Cooperation" (1981) 211 Science
1390 at 1392.
26. George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run
Relationships (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
27. Axelrod & Hamilton, supra note 25.
28. Of course the intensity of internalization is another matter: if the tip was fifteen thousand dollars,
more people might be inclined to not tip. Murder is deeply internalized, but most would still not
murder someone for fifteen thousand dollars. For an interesting discussion of tipping practices in
this respect, see Saul Levmore, "Norms as Supplements" (2000) 86 Va. L. Rev. 1989 at 1997.
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more interesting, why do her friends and fellow tourists chastise her after exiting
the restaurant if she fails to leave a tip? What benefit accrues to them through their
enforcement of the norm?29 Evidence suggests that individuals in fact frequently
enforce norms where they glean no clear benefit, even at considerable personal cost
to themselves.30 Laboratory experiments reveal that individuals commonly repay
acts of altruism and punish norm violators, even in anonymous one-shot interactions
with genetically unrelated strangers." In fact, even when doing so is clearly against
their self-interest, individuals often accept or reject an offer based largely on notions
of "fairness."32 Indeed, the results of behavioral experiments, such as the Dictator
and Ultimatum game, "consistently defy the predictions of traditional rational choice
models"." This is demonstrated in the Ultimatum game, where two players split a
sum of money one time as determined by one of the players.34 The other player can
accept or reject the offer. If the player rejects the offer, however, both players receive
nothing. Both players are told these rules. If the offeree is a rational maximizer of
utility, any offer above zero should suffice for acceptance." However, this is not what
happens. Offers in one-shot experimental games usually average between 30% and
40% of the total.3 6 Offers of 20% are in fact rejected about half the time, and there
is often a clear-cut 50-50 division." These are one-shot games where issues of rep-
utation or retribution have no bearing. Even when the stakes are as high as three
months of their annual income, players routinely reject offers they consider "unfair.""
29. This is the perennial problem for rational choice theorists of a second-order collective action
problem-the irrationality of 3rd party norm enforcers willing to pay the cost of sanctioning
with no clear individual benefit when they can simply free-ride on others enforcement. For sec-
ond-order problems, see, e.g., Paul G. Mahoney & Chris. W Sanchirico, "Norms, Repeated
Games, and the Role of Law" (2003) 91 Cal. L. Rev. 1281.
30. Ernst Fehr, Urs Fischbacher & Simon Gichter, "Strong Reciprocity, Human Cooperation, and
the Enforcement of Social Norms" (2002) 13 Human Nature 1.
31. Ernst Fehr & Joseph Henrich, "Is Strong Reciprocity a Maladaptation?" (2003) Cesifo Working
Paper No. 859, 1. For other studies along these lines, see, e.g., E. Fehr & S. Gichter, "Altruistic
Punishment in Humans" (2002) 415 Nature 137; E. Fehr & S. Giichter, "Reciprocity and
Economics: the Economic Implications of Homo Reciprocans" (1998) 42 Eur. Econ. Rev. 845;
J. Henrich et al., "In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale
Societies" (2001) 91 Am. Econ. Rev. 73; K.A. McCabe, J. Rassenti & VL. Smith, "Reciprocity,
Trust, and Payoff Privacy in Extensive Form Bargaining" (1998) 24 Games Econ. Behav. 10.
The term strong reciprocity has been used to refer to this form of deeply internalized behavior.
Fehr et al., supra note 30; H. Gintis, "Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality" (2000) 206 J.
Theor. Biol. 169.
32. See Richard H. Thaler, Quasi Rational Economics (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1991).
33. Cristina Bicchieri, The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) at 102.
34. W. Guth et al., "An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining" (1982) 3 J. Economic
Behavior and Org. 367.
35. This is perhaps a good example of where our emotions orchestrate our economic interactions
far better than rational calculation. A player must deal with another player whose actions may
be governed by emotion differently than a purely rational actor-in this instance, much more
generously. Self-destructive acts of vengeance are another good example of this dynamic. Indeed,
irrationality (read emotion) often accrues to one's distinct benefit.
36. Cass R. Sunstein, "Social Norms and Social Roles" (1996) 96 Colum. L. Rev. 903 at 904.
37. Bicchieri, supra note 33 at 104.
38. Sunstein, supra note 36 at 905.
39. L. Cameron, "Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental Evidence from
Indonesia" (1999) 37 Economic Inquiry 47 at 47.
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Perhaps even more fascinating is that in experiments where uninterested third parties
are allowed to punish players making unfair offers, they often will, even where they
must personally bear some moderate cost to do so. 4 0
Other research demonstrates that even where cooperation is not an equilibrium
outcome, players nevertheless occasionally cooperate in prisoner dilemma type sit-
uations.4 Other games, such as public goods games, the centipede game and others,
offer similar findings.42 In fact, a great deal of human behavior has been identified
which is neither rational nor self-interested.43 Indeed, it is difficult to reconcile a
great deal of normative behavior with "a theory that takes as a foundational assump-
tion the principle that people always act in their own self interest, to maximize the
satisfaction of their preferences."" This is not the behavior we would expect for
Homo economicus.
Many rational choice theorists respond by broadening their model, positing that,
"norms are simply arbitrary preferences. Individuals [however] ... act rationally
in relation to these, whatever they may be. If people want to help others and get
a sense of satisfaction from doing so, then giving help is an act of rational self-
interest."45 While this allows the model to smoothly function, it does little to
advance our understanding of why these preferences arise. Indeed, this is a core
failure of the standard rational-actor model: the inability to account for why people
hold certain preferences over others.46 Social norms of "trust and justice that indi-
viduals use in their actions have a moral force that runs counter to purely rational
40. Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, "Testing Theories of Fairness-Intentions Matter"
(2008) 62 Games and Economic Behavior 287; see also E. Fehr & U. Fischbacher, Third Party
Punishment and Social Norms (Zurich, Switzerland: Inst. for Empirical Research in Economics,
2004); J.P. Carpenter, P.H. Matthews & 0. Ong'ong'a, "Why Punish? Social Reciprocity and
the Enforcement of Prosocial Norms" (2004) 14 J. Evolutionary Economics 407.
41. G. Marwell & R.E. Ames, "Economists Free Ride: Does Anyone Else?" (1981) 15 J. Public
Economics 295; see also Dan M. Kahan, "Trust, Collective Action, and Law" (2001) 81 B.U.L.
Rev. 333 at 333-34 (citing studies that saw the emergence of cooperation beyond the levels pre-
dicted by just concerns for sanctions).
42. See Richard H. Thaler, The Winner's Curse: Paradoxes and Anomalies of Economic Life
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), especially chapters two and three for a good
review of these findings.
43. See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, "Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics" (2000) 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1051 (arguing for
fundamental modifications to the assumption of rationality); Elinor Ostrom, "A Behavioral
Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action," Presidential Address Before the
American Political Science Association (1997), in 92 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1 (1998) (stating the
need for a "second-generation" rational choice model).
44. W. Bradley Wendel, "Mixed Signals: Rational-Choice Theories of Social Norms and the
Pragmatics of Explanation" (2002) 77 Ind. L.J. I at 10.
45. Scott, supra note 13; see also Sunstein, supra note 36 at 909.
46. Ellickson, supra note I at 156, n.3. However, this failure is, perhaps, matched equally by those
on the Law and Society side in their failure to adequately explain the nature of these preferences,
simply adducing concepts like "norm of cooperation" to explain cooperation. See Wendel, supra
note 44 at 6. Elster compares this approach to explaining the soporific effects of opium in terms
of its "dormative principle." Elster, supra note 13 at 186. Indeed, as Ellickson explains, "A key
shortcoming of the law-and-society school has been its failure to develop a theory of the content
of norms ... sociolologists and other law-and-society scholars have tended to treat observed norms
as exogenous, rather than as dependent variables whose contents are to be explained." Ellickson,
supra note I at 149.
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considerations. The sense of obligation is real and can be felt very strongly"4 7 Most
people will not commit cold-blooded murder, even in the face of great incentive
and an absolute guarantee of impunity and anonymity. This seemingly irrational
conduct is a vexing issue for rational choice theorists. Some critics charge that
the social norms literature "stares at an impasse until more is known about how
such norms develop, operate, and are internalized."" Internalization is a puzzle.
For Posner's theory, a great deal of normative behavior is a major problem. Why,
for instance, do people make anonymous donations to charity? Why do people
observe norms in total privacy? Put simply, if there is nobody to receive the signal,
why do individuals still broadcast discount rate signals?4 9
3. Rational Choice Theory is remiss
We all know the answer. We do not litter when we are alone, for example, because
we just feel it is wrong. Feelings of shame and guiltso that commonly arise from
breaching a norm cannot be casually dismissed. Any theory that purports to explain
norms but in its explanatory rubric fails to address the feeling that the prescribed
behavior is "just the right thing to do" is not only remiss, it is really only telling
a fragment of the story. To speak of norms without speaking of internalization is
like discussing fine dining without any mention of food. The presence of inter-
nalization is the defining essence of a norm-it is at the end of the day what we
are talking about. The proposition that individuals make a rational choice each time
they conform to a norm is patently false, and simply does not square with what
we know as true. Some situations do call for calculated decisions, for instance the
traveler in an alien culture, or the Hells angel biker dining with country club aris-
tocrats (and vice versa), but the vast majority of occasions see individuals simply
guided by a genuine belief in the inherent correctness of the norm-a quasi-natural
law-like conviction of right and wrong. As I define it here, a norm is thus a pattern
ofbehavior that has been commonly internalized to some degree or another gen-
erating a sense of implicit obligation." This decentralized behavioural standard
gives rise to certain beliefs. If a person feels it is inherently wrong to commit mur-
der, this has a normative quality to it; if a person feels it is inherently wrong to wear
47. Scott, supra note 13 at 134; see also K.S. Cook & R.M. Emerson, "Power, Equity and
Commitment in Exchange Networks" (1978) 43 American Sociological Rev. 721.
48. Neil Duxbury, "Signaling and Social Norms" (2001) 21 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 719; see also,
e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinsky, "The Limits of Social Norms" (2000) 74 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 1537;
Robert E. Scott, "The Limits of Behavioural Theories of Law and Social Norms" (2000) 86
Va. L. Rev. 1603.
49. Posner acknowledges that people do behave in this fashion. Posner, supra note 5 at 38, 43. Note
that this dilemma applies equally to norm enforcement. Posner responds by stating that "rational
choice theory can be used to explain some social phenomena but not other social phenomena."
Ibid.
50. Some norm scholars make a distinction between shame and guilt, pointing out that shame is
related to compliance, while guilt brings up issues of voluntary conformity. See, e.g., ibid. at
43. For our purposes, however, both are expressions of internalization.
51. 1 am in good company: Cooter also asserts a norm only exists if it has been internalized. Robert
D. Cooter, "Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating
the New Law Merchant" (1996) 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1643 at 1661-66.
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pinstripes with poke dots, this too has a normative quality to it. The difference is
merely in degree of internalization.
Posner, however, seeks to sidestep the issue of internalization in his signaling
theory, stating that his approach "... reflects a methodological commitment. My
claim," he writes,
is that rational choice theory can shed light on social norms by focusing on the rep-
utational source of behavioral regularities to the exclusion of their cognitive and emo-
tional sources. I do not claim that rational choice theory can offer a complete
explanation of social norms or of cooperation. Cognition and emotion are not irrelevant.
They are just not well enough understood by psychologists to support a theory of social
norms, and repeated but puzzled acknowledgments of their importance would muddy
the exposition of the argument without providing any offsetting benefits.52
Posner's model gives no role to internalization, or emotions of any kind."
Individuals "are thus 'stripped down' to simple, mostly selfish and rational indi-
viduals who pursue material, not normative, ends."5 4 Indeed, as Posner explains,
"In this model the social norm has no independent power, it is not an exogenous
force, it is not internalized; it is a term for behavioral regularities that emerge as
people interact with each other in pursuit of their everyday interests."" In Posner's
defense, he does not deny the importance of internalization; he just chooses to
ignore it. His theory, Posner says, is "compatible with emotions and cognitive biases
... it is in tension only with comprehensive emotion-based or cognitive theories
for compliance with social norms.""6 For Posner, such theories are "methodolog-
ically sterile"." They cannot, he argues, predict what kinds of people will internalize
norms and in what situations, nor can they predict what kinds of behavior regu-
larities are more likely to occur." Moreover, such theories treat norms as exogenous,
but why they arise in the first place is left mostly unexplained." This paper, however,
advances the notion that Posner's signaling theory, slightly modified to incorporate
internalization, can in fact account for all of this. I understand why Posner wishes
to avoid the unquantifiable nature and general messiness of emotion.60 However,
there is no reason (other than intellectual preference) that necessitates that a sig-
naling theory of norms must, or should, be hung exclusively upon the peg of rational
choice.' In fact, if we are to render a proper accounting of norms, the reach of our
theory must include internalization. It cannot be ignored.
52. Posner, supra note 5 at 46.
53. Posner, supra note 16 at 477.
54. McAdams, supra note 2 at 679.
55. Posner, supra note 5 at 26.
56. Posner, supra note 16 at 472.
57. Posner, supra note 5 at 43.
58. Ibid. at 43-44.
59. Ibid. at 44.
60. Interestingly, Posner's earlier work did not exhibit this rejection of all things normative:" ... even
a complete game-theoretic account of cooperative behavior would miss some essential aspects
of norms. We say about most norms that people bound by them feel an emotional or psychological
compulsion to obey the norms; norms have moral force ... Game theory does not explain these
phenomena." Posner, supra note 3 at 1709.
61. For a critique of Posner's theory in this respect, see McAdams, supra note 2 at 678-87.
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B. Expanding Posner's Model: Internalization, Natural Selection, and the
Expanded Signaling Model of Norms
1. Applying an Evolutionary Model to the Signaling Game
Some rational choice theorists do not entirely ignore normative motivations.62
McAdams, for instance, incorporates internalization into his model in the form the
need for esteem; though he seems willing to open the door to internalization just
enough so as to construct a rational actor model from it.6 However, his esteem
model does not adequately account for why compliance with certain norms, specif-
ically non-functional idiosyncratic norms, should evoke esteem from others in the
first place.' McAdams admits this, stating, "I have only a little to say about where
the patterns of approval and disapproval come from ... "6' Posner's signaling theory
is much better in this respect. It explains why people adopt the norms they do, even
those that appear idiosyncratic and non-functional, and he does so employing an
elegantly parsimonious model. Posner's theory, however, completely omits the real-
ity of internalization. This is a gaping hole in the center of his theory. In his fervent
effort to remain within the boundaries of rational choice, his account at times ends
up somewhat strained.
However, as I claimed in the outset of paper, the signaling theory of norms can
be aligned with the phenomenon of internalization (this is my first major departure
from Posner, and an important one). This is achieved by incorporating natural
selection into our theory. Indeed, they can coexist quite cleanly: evolution has gen-
erated an instinctual proficiency in working with norms as signals in whatever
form they take-a proficiency that invariably manifests in an emotional context.
This is what we call internalization. Internalization is a product of evolution that
enhances the individual's ability to instinctively engage in this signaling game.
Mastery over signaling games, and therefore the ability to identify suitable eco-
nomic partners, is implicitly related to survival. Adeptness at the signaling game
provides an evolutionary advantage. We have thus learned to rapidly internalize
norms in response to these signals in a relatively fluid fashion. Indeed, the emotions
and cognitive biases that Posner chooses to ignore are the very product of his sig-
naling game. This section will lay out an evolutionary model for Posner's signaling
game; the section that follows examines the theoretical difficulties that arise with
such a model.
62. Besides Cooter, McAdams, and Elster are perhaps the two most prominent. See Elster, supra
note 46; Jon Elster, "Norms of Revenge" (1990) 100 Ethics 862; McAdams, supra note 3 at 338;
see also Philip Pettit, "Virtus Normativa: Rational Choice Perspectives" (1990) 100 Ethics 725
at 730.
63. McAdams, supra note 3 at 338. Others also argue along these lines, see B.D. Bemheim, "A Theory
of Conformity" (1994) 102 J. Pol. Economy 841; George A. Akerlof, "Social Distance and Social
Decisions" (1997) 65 Econometrica 1005.
64. Bicchieri's criticism of such an approach applies: "Yet to maintain that we conform to social norms
because of the disapproval involved in violating them is of little help in explaining why norms
are there, how they emerged, and why they persist."Cristina Bicchieri, "Norms of Cooperation"
(1990) 100 Ethics 838 at 839.
65. McAdams, supra note 2 at 687.
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As Robert Cooter explains, " ... people internalize morality to improve their
opportunities for cooperating with others."' Internalization is nature's way of mak-
ing sure that the signaling game does not have to rely only upon rational choice.
In its usual fashion, nature prefers to ensure survival-friendly behavior by manip-
ulating the organism through its emotions and conceptions of value rather than
solely through rationality, which at times may be faulty owing to its bounded
nature."7 Returning again to the example of thirst: the discomfort of thirst, for
instance, takes care of the body's need for water even though a decision to drink
could also be made after consciously assessing that one is slightly dehydrated. But
there is no need to; the emotions exist to regulate behavior." Feelings of affection
and disdain are a highly effective way to engage in the signaling game. We are,
for example, disgusted by acts of selfishness in others, without ever needing to cal-
culate that selfishness is a signal expressing that the person in question is a poor
economic partner. Conversely, we admire acts of selflessness in others, towards
whom we generate generally positive feelings, hardly conscious that such a char-
acter trait renders them model cooperative partners. The qualities we tend to look
for in a friend-mutual trust, common values, intelligence, generosity, a sense of
fairness, reliable-are disturbingly similar to a reliable business partner. We do
not think of our friends and loved ones as stable economic partners, but they are.
Trusts builds slowly between people as they emit and receive countless signals,
and thus are able to coherently flesh out what kind of person the other party is, i.e.
their discount rate. Indeed, feelings of affection are synonymous with feelings of
trust. Again, this could be achieved through a rational evaluation of the signals,
but there is no need to; internalizing the signaling game and placing it within an
emotional context is all that is required, and is in fact more efficient due to the nat-
ural limits of rationality. At the end of the day, we eat because we feel hungry, not
"in response to a rational calculus of caloric need."' We thus go about our business
emitting signals, for the most part, hardly conscious that we are doing so. And
equally, we interpret the discount rate signals we receive from other people mostly
on the level of gut emotional reaction. Internalization is how the manifold com-
plexity of signaling is rendered more manageable."o
66. Robert Cooter, "Do Good Laws Make Good Neighbors? An Economic Analysis of Internalized
Norms" (2000) 86 Va. L. Rev. 1577 at 1601.
67. Many rational choice theorists in fact employ evolutionary models that presuppose this kind of
bounded rationality to explain norm emergence. See, e.g., Robert Axelrod, The Complexity of
Cooperation: Agent-Based Models of Competition and Collaboration (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1997); Brian Skyrms, Evolution of the Social Contract (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996); H. Peyton Young, Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An
Evolutionary Theory ofInstitutions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998). See also,
e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Law & Economics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2000); Korobkin & Ule, supra note 43.
68. Indeed, Frank sees the emotions as the progenitor of moral behavior rather than rational decisions.
Robert H. Frank, Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions (New York: W
W Norton & Co., 1988) at 51-56.
69. "Individuals do not eat in response to a rational calculus of caloric need. Instead, a complex set
of forces causes one to 'feel hungry."' Robert E. Scott, "The Limits of Behavioral Theories of
Law and Social Norms" (2000) 86 Va. L. Rev. 1603 at 1606 (referencing Frank, supra note 68).
70. Robert Trivers famously presented a similar idea in his 1971 paper The Evolution ofReciprocal
Altruism. Trivers argued that due to the difficulty involved in computing the complex cost-benefit
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Even our emotional responses to the normative breaches of others is itself a
signal of what kind of economic partner we are: sanctioning offences against third
parties unrelated to us expresses our commitment to the norm and thus our dis-
count rate (this is Posner's answer to the second-order enforcement problem, i.e.
the tipping tourist's chastising friends); standing up for oneself when personally
slighted signals that one expects to be treated fairly under these same normative
rules in future rounds of cooperation (predictably, the greater the audience, the
more intense this emotional impulse to respond tends to be-i.e. perceptions of
personal dignity and self-esteem). Indeed, nature channels our behavior through
tweaking our perceptions of value.72 We copulate because it is exciting; we social-
ize because we enjoy the company of others, and so on and so forth. And this
holds equally true for the more sophisticated value conceptions that surround
normative beliefs.
Internalization is the answer to the puzzle of irrational norm compliance. The
time we spend adopting social norms in public is a breeding period for the inter-
nalization of norms. It deepens internalization to the point where norms are so
inculcated into our core tendencies that they still influence our behavior in
private." Their internalization becomes so embedded into our character that it
spills into private spheres where they appear to have no logical purpose in terms
of maximizing individual utility. But this conclusion is shortsighted. These acts
are not without purpose; they are profitable investments. If internalization is to
have the effect it does, efficiently guiding our actions when in public, individuals
must possess a legitimate belief in the objective legitimacy of these norms, and
so subscribe to them equally in private. This belief in the norm's objective legit-
imacy is why internalization is so effective, and it cannot simply be switched off.
To do so would undercut the potency of the norm, and render it largely ineffectual.
Normative beliefs work more effectively when they are felt to be objective truths.74
The utility we may sometimes lose by holding fast to our normative beliefs when
in private does not compare to the enormous overall benefit gleaned from the
proficient use of social norms as discount rate signals. Thus, despite sometimes
appearing inefficient, internalization provides a net survival value-it secures
us reliable cooperative partners.
ratios that underpin long-term reciprocity, human emotions evolved as a regulating mechanism.
See R.L. Trivers, "The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism" (1971) 46 Q. Rev. Biology 35. To facil-
itate this system of reciprocal altruism, "feelings and emotions-including guilt, fairness, moral-
istic aggression, gratitude, and sympathy-are part of the normal repertoire of human responses
and are evoked in predictable situations." Harmon Holcomb & Jason Bryon, "Sociobiology"
(Stanford, CA: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2005).
71. Posner, supra note 5 at 25.
72. See Gintis, supra note 11 (arguing that the ability to internalize norms evolves as it enhances indi-
vidual fitness in situations where social behavior has become too complex to be evaluated piece-
meal through individual rational assessment).
73. McAdams, supra note 3 at 376; see also Franks, supra note 68 at 152-61; Robert Ellickson,
"Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and
Economics" (1989) 65 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 23 at 45-46.
74. Scott makes a similar point, though he is speaking about internalization in general: Scott, supra
note 48 at 1621 ("There is long-term advantage in moral behavior. But in order for emotions,
such as guilt, to work as self-enforcing commitments, satisfaction must be intrinsic in the act
of compliance and not premised on the possibility that material gains may follow.").
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If you were one of the prisoners in the prisoner's dilemma, who would you prefer
to have in the other room: a rational actor or someone who has deeply internalized
the norm of loyalty? If both prisoners have internalized the norm of loyalty, then
there is no dilemma. This is why we internalize norms-because blind emotion
is more reliable, and makes a better cooperative partner than a rational actor. The
solution to the prisoners' dilemma need not be repetition, moral principle does the
trick. Self-imposed internal sanctions in the form of a conscience are far more con-
sistent. Who is a more reliable cooperative partner: someone who cooperates as
they have calculated it is in their own present interest to do so, or someone who
loves you? Which do people naturally tend to prefer? Evolution conditions our emo-
tions on all fronts that relate to survival. This is in fact the point of departure for
ideas such as evolutionary psychology and sociobiology.
2. Sociobiology and human emotions
The research of sociobiology and evolutionary game theory lend strong support
to the idea that normative beliefs are a product of natural selection. For years, the-
orists in these fields have addressed the paradox of cooperation, arguing that human
emotions are simply adaptive traits shaped by evolutionary pressures. Robert
Trivers, for instance, suggests that human emotions have evolved so as to reinforce
reciprocal cooperation and tit-for-tat strategies." As a consequence the human psy-
che has been hard-wired with a predisposition towards "friendship, to gratitude
and sympathy, to moralistic aggression against noncooperative behavior, to guilt
and reparative altruism, to a sense ofjustice, and even a capacity for detecting deceit
and for self-deception." 6 John Maynard Smith building on Trivers's model, made
use of game theory to develop the notion of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS),
stable in the sense that once it emerges, natural selection alone is sufficient to fix
it in place." Axelrod argues that the tit-for-tat norm indeed can be explained as a
product of natural selection, suggesting that the instinct to obey certain norms is
an adaptive behavior." Similarly, others have argued that emotional tendencies such
as gratitude and hostility have evolved precisely because they are effective strategies
when interacting with rational maximizers."
75. Trivers, supra note 70; R.L. Trivers, Social Evolution (San Francisco, CA: Benjamin/Cummings,
1985) at 388-89. See also R.L. Trivers, "Reciprocal Altruism: 30 Years Later" in PK. Kappeler
& C.P Van Schaik, eds., Cooperation in Primates and Humans: Mechanisms and Evolution
(Berlin: Springer, 2006) 67.
76. Frangois Nielsen, "Sociobiology and Sociology" (1994) 20 Ann'l Rev. Socio. 267 at 277.
77. See J. Maynard Smith & G.R. Price, "The Logic of Animal Conflict" (1973) 246 Nature 15; J.
Maynard Smith, Evolution and the Theory of Games (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1982).
78. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books) at 88-105; see also
Axelrod & Hamilton, supra note 25.
79. See J. Hirshleifer, "On the Emotions as Guarantors of Threats and Promises" in John Dupre,
ed., The Latest on the Best: Essays on Evolution and Optimality (Cambridge, MA: The MIT
Press, 1987) 307; J. Hirshleifer, "The Affections and the Passions: Their Economic Logic" (1993)
5 Rationality Soc. 185; J. Hirshleifer, "Evolutionary Models in Economics and Law: Cooperation
Versus Conflict Strategies" in J. Hirshleifer, ed., The Dark Side of the Force: Economic
Foundations of Conflict Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 183; see also
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The body of scholarship in these areas is large, a survey of which would take
us far off course. My intention here is to merely tether their common conclusion-
that our value conceptions have been shaped by evolutionary forces-to Posner's
signaling theory of norms, thus creating a bridge by which internalization can be
incorporated into our model.
3. Emotion-Norm distinction
This literature, however, overlooks a crucial theoretical link between natural selec-
tion and social norms-discount rate signals. It is important that we distinguish
here between emotion and complex normative values. They are not one and the
same."o Without normative beliefs, emotions would still exist; without emotions,
norms could not exist."' We internalize norms so we can better employ them, uti-
lizing emotions to achieve this end. Basic emotions "are those which can be found
in other mammals, are hard-wired in the brain, are reflexively produced in response
to certain stimuli, are associated with certain, sometimes species-specific, phys-
iological responses ... and, in humans, are found cross-culturally and at an early
age."82 For example, the emotion of fear is an evolved trait, providing obvious sur-
vival advantages. However, fear of a particular race, or the racial hatred that goes
hand in hand with this fear, is not-it is the internalization of discount rate signals
between individuals in a particular group manifesting as a normative belief, i.e.
racist norms." To use another example, affection is an innate emotion, however,
affection for one's country, is a norm that arises in response to discount rate signals
dominant within one's network. Although emotion is involved, patriotism is a
signal." The same holds true for an affinity for particular religious practices, manner
of dressing, tattooing, etiquette, and even acts of charity. Disgust is a basic emotion,
but disgust regarding certain sexual practices, i.e. sexual mores, is a normative value
-a signaling equilibrium within one's group. The evolutionary role of aggression
is obvious. Aggression towards someone who puts their elbows on the dinner table,
reads over your shoulder, or cuts you off driving, is the operation of a normative
standard-a discount rate signal equilibrium embedded in emotion. To analogize:
hunger is universal; however, the particular dishes one like's is highly contingent
H. Margolis, Selfishness, Altruism and Rationality: A Theory of Social Choice (Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press, 1982); R. Frank, supra note 68; Robert Sugden, The Economics
ofRights, Co-Operation and Welfare (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986) at 145-47; Cooter, supra note
51 at 1662 (discussing the psychological underpinning that induces norm compliance).
80. See R. Plutchik, Emotion: A Psychoevolutionary Synthesis (New York: Harper & Row, 1980)
(positing an evolutionary model of emotion in which primary emotions are distinguished from
more complex emotions); see also J. Panskepp, "Toward a General Psychobiological Theory of
Emotions" (1982) 5 Behavioral and Brain Sciences 407.
81. See Jon Elster, Strong Feelings: Emotion, Addiction, and Human Behavior (Cambridge, MA:
The MIT Press, 2000) at 98 (citing emotions as supporting social norms).
82. See L. Mealey, "The Sociobiology of Sociopathy: An Integrated Evolutionary Model" in Simon
Baron-Cohen, ed., The Maladapted Mind: Classic Readings in Evolutionary Psychopathology
(East Sussex, UK: Psychology Press, 1997) 133 at 170 at n.2.
83. Posner gives an illuminating explanation of racist norms as discount rate signals. See Posner,
supra note 5 at 133-43.
84. Ibid. at 112-19.
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upon upbringing and culture. Emotions are fitness enhancing in that they channel
our basic behavior: contact with fire is painful, so the hand recoils. Normative
beliefs are fitness enhancing in that they direct our behavior with regards to signals.
These signals are embedded within emotion so they can be employed more pro-
ficiently, and without the need for rational calculation.
Thus, we are not hard-wired with normative values; the internalization of signals
gives rise to normative evaluations. What we are 'hard-wired' with, rather, is merely
the simple instinct to internalize discount rate signals in whatever form they take.
This then produces complex concepts of a normative nature. Elaborate normative
beliefs are not etched into the core of our characters, but instead are highly fluid
and malleable." This becomes clear when we consider how normative beliefs vary
across cultures, and shift over time, and how susceptible moral beliefs are to group
pressures (this is examined in greater detail below)." The frequent arbitrariness
of social norms underscores this reality-within networks of people, norms often
emerge that are amazingly idiosyncratic. Thus, we are not hard-wired, for instance,
with a tendency towards altruistic behavior per se; we are simply hard-wired with
a tendency to recognize and internalize low discount rate signals, and this causes
us to internalize norms of an altruistic nature. Posner's signals are thus the crucial
link between emotion and the emergence of norms.
4. Posner s Proviso
Posner anticipates that many will object to his theory arguing that norms relating to
such things as racial discrimination, patriotism, and fashion "bubble forth from a caul-
dron of instincts, passions, and deeply ingrained cultural attitudes."87 He responds
by recognizing the legitimacy of such criticisms, then retreats into a defense of his
methodological commitment." I give no such ground. My contention here is that all
such "complex social phenomenon" are but evolutionary byproducts of a simple sig-
naling game. Utilizing social norms is instrumental to our survival, thus group behav-
ior is imbued with an emotional dimension-a normative nature. In the language
of Evolutionary psychology, internalization is an evolved psychological mechanism."
Internalization enhances our ability to play the signaling game-it does so by putting
it into a normative context, ascribing feelings of right and wrong to certain behaviors.
This is a sense that particular behaviors connote an objective moral dimension in all
circumstances. This is vital to maintain the impression that the act possesses an objec-
tive ethical reality. The end result being that even in private this sense will remain
operative, influencing the individual's behavior where it may seem irrational from
a rational actor model (as in our example of the tipping tourist)."
85. See infra notes 161-68 and accompanying text.
86. S.E. Asch, "Opinions and Social Pressure" (1955) 193 Scientific American 31; M. Sherif, "An
Experimental Approach to the Study of Attitudes" (1937) 1 Sociometry 90.
87. Posner, supra note 5 at 46.
88. Ibid.
89. David M. Buss, Evolutionary Psychology: The New Science of the Mind (Boston, MA: Allyn
& Bacon, 2004) at 50.
90. See Frank, supra note 68 at 5-7.
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Because normative beliefs have been internalized, in a sense, etched into the
core character of the actor, their behavior becomes that much more dependable and
predictable, making others more willing to rely on assumptions about the individ-
ual's future behavior." Bonds of association governed by participants' internalized
sense of right and wrong are thus far more stable. The dizzying complexity of emit-
ting and receiving countless discount signals is difficult to negotiate through a ratio-
nal decision making process. Navigating this complexity is simplified enormously;
indeed it is made possible, when the entire undertaking plays out within the realm
of internalized value, and gut feeling. This reinforces the signaling game, providing
a distinct evolutionary advantage to agents who internalize norms.
Posner in his insistence on remaining within the confines of a strict rational
choice model identifies only one side of the equation; indeed, it is a very narrow
slice, as the bulk of human behavior is not guided purely by rational deliberation.
What is missing in the pure rational actor model of norms is the first-person phe-
nomenology of social experience-the experience of reacting to normative values."
Indeed, traditional micro-economics treats the internalization of norms as an "exoge-
nous taste."I' The present model parts company with most other law and norm the-
ories in terms of the robust emphasis it places upon internalization.94
The signaling game becomes internalized and translated into feelings of "right
and wrong." From fashion tastes to moral convictions, an individual's value system
stems from the internalization (or lack thereof) of a signaling game with those
within her signaling network. It is a means of tacit communication with potential
cooperators, broadcasting that one is a team player. In the struggle to secure eco-
nomic partners, only one signal is of any real importance: cooperator or non-coop-
erator. The vast complexity of internalization and the normative values it engenders
can be reduced to the elementary mechanics of sending and reading these simple
signals. From our perspective, it is difficult to conceptualize norms detached from
the moral dimensions they engender; this is after all the prism through which we
look. Nevertheless, nature speaks in a simple binary code of high and low discount
rates, which we then hear in the complex language of emotional-moral concep-
tions. Understanding this code we can understand a great deal: "No one thinks
that baseball players consciously solve quadratic equations whenever they throw
the ball, but we can nevertheless predict the path the baseball takes using quadratic
91. Scott, supra note 48 at 1606 ("Salient emotional reactions-such as guilt, anger, or empathy-mark
one as a 'cooperator' who is able to make credible commitments concerning her future actions.").
92. A point adamantly made by Wendel in his critique of Posner, see Wendel, supra note 44 at 30
(" ... it matters critically whether the theory is radically at odds with one's subjective experiences.
In these contexts, we may have reason to reject the rational-choice model in favor of one that
employs explanatory concepts that are congruent with those actually deployed by the deliberating
individual.").
93. Robert Cooter, "The Normative Failure of Law" (1997) 82 Cornell L. Rev. 947 at 952; see, e.g.,
Avner Grief, Paul Milgrom & Barry Weingast, "Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement:
The Case of the Merchant Guild" (1994) 102 J. Pol. Economy 745 at 764-71; Paul Milgrom,
Douglass North, & Barry Weingast, "The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law
Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs" (1990) 2 Economy & Politics I at 6-14.
94. Cooter being one notable exception. See Cooter, supra note 51 at 1690-94; Cooter, supra note
66; Cooter, supra note 93.
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equations."" Indeed, our norm players play these signaling games hardly conscious
that they are signaling discount rates. The signaling process is mostly instinctual.
Yet because they conceptualize norms in terms of values, emotion, and morality,
they play the game quite effectively.
Discount rates are the language of reality; moral creeds are the language of peo-
ple. 6 Both are valid descriptions as much as fluctuations in air pressure and music
describe the same thing. However, our moral universe, flowering as it does into
complexity, can be reduced to simple discount rate signals expressing cooperation
or opportunism." We construct entire cultures around this deeply internalized sig-
naling game. Our concepts of fairness and justice spring from this signaling game.
As Robert Sugden explains, the norms that we subscribe to may "have moral force
for us. But if they do, that is because our moral beliefs are the products of the same
process of evolution."" All morally praiseworthy acts imply a degree of self-sac-
rifice, deferring one's own interests-it is a signal. The intensity of this moral qual-
ity is directly commensurate with the degree of self-sacrifice (and the reverse is
true). It is no doubt unsettling to conceptualize the bonds of friendship and com-
munity as an economic scheme fashioned by evolution. It is a distinctively chilling
Hobbesian view of human nature; unfortunately, our discomfort does not invalidate
the argument." (Though we should note that deconstructing music in terms of air
density does not make music any less beautiful). I do not wish to digress into the
theoretical intricacy of postmodern analysis, however, it should be noted that the
present model thrusts us forcefully in that direction. Having proposed an evolu-
tionary framework for Posner's signaling game, I will now examine the theoretical
difficulties that arise when we embrace such a model.
95. Douglas G. Baird, Robert H. Gertner, & Randal C. Picker, Game Theory and the Law (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1994) at 125.
96. For example, animals certainly kill, but it is unclear if an animal can commit murder; we don't
have the moral language for this, as we don't impose norms on animal behavior in the way we
do for human conduct.
97. A bold assertion could be made here that follows from this line of reasoning: Morality does not
exist outside the world of these discount signals. The arc of our moral universe is wholly con-
structed from this signaling game-morality is an emergent property. When one considers that
approximately 4% of all males (sociopaths) do not experience moral sentiment at all, the onus
would seem to rest with those claiming its objective validity-if they cannot meet this burden,
one would have to conclude that it is not an objective truth but rather a subjective concoction.
However, a Kantian universal moral truth is not necessarily denied here. One could equally make
the case that evolution merely provides otherwise selfish organisms a degree of clarity in regards
to certain moral truths where and when it confers an evolutionary advantage.
98. Robert Sugden,"Spontaneous Order" (1989) J. Economic Perspectives 85 at 95. Sugden uses
the term "convention".
99. An important point regarding rational choice theory should, however, be understood here. Arguably,
behavior based upon self-interest is just as much a product of internalization as selfless behavior.
It is simply the internationalization of a different order, one that imparts a normative quality to
self-interest. Indeed, a rational calculus is employed, but it is predicated on a fundamental assump-
tion that is no less normative in nature. The tremendous survival advantage of selfishness ensured
it was evolutionarily selected for to a degree. The rationality of rational choice is that decisions
are made through a careful cost benefit analysis; however, the basis for this analysis (self-interest)
is still very much normative. My point here is that in either case-rational choice, or the blind
internalization of norms-internalization is present. Even the most self-serving individuals believe
they are normatively justified in their self-interest. Indeed, an argument could be made that the
difference is more the nature of the internalization then the presence or absence of it.
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II. Key Questions this Model brings up-and their Answers
A. Some questions the Expanded Signaling Model brings up
What I have said up to this point regarding natural selection and internalization
is not altogether original.'" It has been the stomping ground of evolutionary psy-
chologists and sociobiologists for some time now. However, as far as I know, linking
this assumption explicitly to discount rate signals is. In fact, doing so may help
resolve some key questions that plague an evolutionary approach to norms. There
are, however, two basic problems that arise with this explanation that I will now
address. First, why would norms that are inefficient (as is often the case) be selected
for? Second, if norm internalization is fitness enhancing, would not even individuals
possessing high discount rates also evolve a predisposition to internalize low dis-
count rate signals?
The answer to both of these questions lies here: I submit that, contrary to com-
mon assumptions, evolution does not generate the internalization of specific norms
because of their inherent survival advantage; rather, it generates the tendency to
internalize, in varying degrees, any norm that functions as a signal of discount
rates'0 -the survival advantage is in its role as a signal. Thus, what has been
selected for is the internalization of discount rate signals, not the particular expres-
sion the signal happens to take. The norms themselves do not necessarily provide
any intrinsic survival advantage (consider dinner etiquette). They might even appear
disadvantageous. Rather, survival value rests in the ability to utilize norms as sig-
nals; in this sense, the norm's actual content takes a backseat of relative less impor-
tance. Therefore even "inefficient" norms arise because they still serve an important
evolutionary function-they are signals.
B. Functional Norms and "Inefficient Norms"
Before examining these two questions, however, some preliminary discussion is
required. First, some comment should be made here regarding the nature of norms.
I posit that all social norms serve as signals. However, there are two varieties: norms
with no clear function beyond that of signaling, and norms that serve a non-sig-
naling function in addition to their use as signals. The content of some norms pro-
vide an inherent survival benefit, norms related to hygiene for instance. Such norms
may be distinguished from norms whose sole use are as signals, table manners for
example. Posner is particularly interested in this second class of norms, which are
more arbitrary in nature.10 2 I will call this first class functional norms as distin-
guished from non-functional norms (though this second name is slightly misleading
100. See supra note 12.
101. Or not internalize as in the case of pure opportunists. What is therefore meant here is the degree
of internalization has been selected for.
102. Posner, supra note 5 at 37 ("[W]hat might emerge as a conventional signal in any group is to
a certain extent arbitrary.").
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as these norms do indeed provide a vital function as signals)."o3 Functional norms
stabilize and thrive due to their inherent benefit in response to cultural selection
pressures, as well as a result of their role as signals. Their functional value in con-
junction with their signaling value works to proliferate the norm.
However, norms that do not provide any clear functional benefit in terms of sur-
vival (think table manners, tattooing, fashion norms-these I will call non-func-
tional norms) stabilized, as Posner explains, purely due to their use as signals.'"
Essentially, "when a pattern of behavior arises completely at random, any (random)
deviation from the (statistical) norm becomes salient, and an opportunity for anyone
to signal that he belongs to the good type."o' Posner also posits the idea of norm
entrepreneurs as playing a crucial role in advocating for the use of specific behaviors
as signals. 06 Through their use as signals they become stable signaling
equilibria-social norms."' The evolutionary resilience of functional norms stem-
ming from their inherent non-signaling benefit made them salient points of behavior
from which they could evolve into signals. They are in a sense co-opted as signals.
Becoming discount rate signals further entrenches their normative characteristic.
For instance, refraining from murdering others serves a vital functional purpose
as well as a strong signal that one is a cooperative type (murder of group members
is perhaps the clearest signal that one is a non-cooperator). Other behaviors,
although providing no intrinsic benefit, were sufficiently salient so as to also pro-
liferate into signals, though their specific subject matter (beyond the discount rate
they express) is of no real consequence.
Functional or non-functional, all norms are the same in the sense that they serve
as discount rate signals. The intrinsic evolutionary advantage to functional norms
coupled with their signaling capacity, contribute to their stability and spread. Not
surprisingly, because of their practical utility, this class of norm tends to be relatively
consistent across cultures and historical periods. The greater this practical utility;
the greater its universality (e.g. proscription against murder, incest, cannibalism).
103. For a good overview of the literature regarding this distinction, see Robert B. Cialdini & Melanie
R. Trost, "Social Influence: Social Norms, Conformity, and Compliance" in Daniel T. Gilbert,
Susan T. Fiske & Gardner Lindzey, eds., The Handbook ofSocial Psychology, vol. 2 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1998) 151 at 152-53.
104. Posner, supra note 5 at 25.
105. Ibid. See also Sugden, supra note 79 at 47-52, where he speaks of "focal points." Schelling was
perhaps the first to articulate this idea of salience or focal points, facilitating coordination. See
Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980)
at 53-80, 83-118.
106. Posner, supra note 5 at 29-32.
107. We can see this clearly with norms of an aesthetic nature. For example, the sexualizing of woman's
breasts might be explained in this manner. Likewise, aesthetic offenses such as facial pimples,
obesity, and male-pattern baldness might be attributed to their common characteristic of obvi-
ousness. To be sure, it would be hard to imagine a norm of this nature arising that could not be
plainly seen by others. Research regarding the difficulty in creating a brand image for "invisible"
products that are not readily observable, such as men's underwear, illustrates this point in the
context of fashion norms (though even here a select few will see the product). See Jui-Yen Yen
& Mei-Liang Chen, "Creating Brand Value in Third Countries: A Case of Underwear Industry"
(2007) J. International Management Studies 133 (concluding that there is a necessity to place
an inordinate emphasis on quality in marketing as a way of overcoming branding difficulties
related to invisible products).
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Non-functional norms, for their part, are far more culturally idiosyncratic, as non-
functional norms stabilized and spread due purely to their signaling function, and
thus are often arbitrary.
C Costly Signaling Theory
Some mention should also be made here regarding the roots of Posner's signaling
model--costly signaling theory-as some of the findings in this literature may be
of use to us. Arising independently in economics and evolutionary biology, costly
signaling theory (CST) holds that certain behaviors are adaptive in that they are
difficult-to-fake signals of certain unobservable traits of an actor, such as access
to resources, disease resistance, physical prowess, etc. 0 ' The act constitutes "an
honest signal of the member's quality as a mate, coalition partner or competitor,
and therefore results in advantageous alliances for those signaling in this manner."'"
They are "reliable" signals because of their costly nature, similar to how the pur-
chasing of expensive art is a reliable indicator of an individual's wealth, as someone
lacking financial resources simply could not afford to waste money on such a thing.
Actors lacking the quality (here the quality is wealth) are simply incapable of mim-
icking the signal. Sending such signals benefits both the sender and the receiver
as they are able to identify each other. The earliest work on signaling games was
Michael Spence's model of education signaling and, in the field of biology, A.
Zahari's work on animal signaling, later formalized by Alan Grafen and Charles
Godfray."o The CST literature has grown over the past three decades, with the pro-
liferation of theoretical models, as economics and evolutionary biological
approaches to human behavior have converged."' Posner constructed his model
108. Eric A. Smith & Rebecca Bliege Bird, "Costly Signaling and Cooperative Behaviour" in Herbert
Gintis et al., eds., Moral Sentiments and Material Interests: The Foundations of Cooperation
In Economic Life (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2005) 116.
109. Herbert Gintis, Eric Alden Smith & Samuel Bowles, "Costly Signaling and Cooperation" (2001)
213 J. Theor. Biol. 103 at 103.
110. Though Veblen in his study of conspicuous consumption should be credited with first postulating
the idea of signaling. Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study
in the Evolution ofInstitutions, Indian ed. (New Delhi, India: Aakar Books, 2005 [1899]); A.M.
Spence, "Job Market Signaling" (1973) 90 Quarterly J. Economics 225; A. Zahavi, "Mate
Selection-a Selection for a Handicap" (1975) 53 J. Theor. Biol. 205; A. Zahavi, "Reliability
in Communication Systems and the Evolution of Altruism" in B. Stonehouse & C.M. Perrins,
eds., Evolutionary Ecology (Baltimore, MD: University Park Press, 1977) 253; A. Grafen,
"Biological Signals as Handicaps" (1990) 144 J. Theor. Biol. 517; H.C.J. Godfray, "Signaling
of Need by Offspring to Their Parents" (1991) 352 Nature 328.
111. Exploration on the biological side tends to be far richer. Although not an exhaustive list, see,
e.g., J. Maynard Smith, "Honest Signaling: The Philip Sidney Game" (1991) 42 Animal Behaviour
1034; N. Nur & 0. Hasson, "Phenotypic Plasticity and the Handicap Principle" (1984) 110 J.
Theor. Biol. 275; M. Enquist, "Communication During Aggressive Interactions with Particular
Reference to Variation in Choice of Behaviour" (1985) 33 Animal Behaviour 1152; J. Maynard
Smith & D.G.C. Harper, "The Evolution of Aggression: can Selection Generate Variability?"
(1988) 319 Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, 557; R.A. Johnstone
& A. Grafen, "The Continuous Sir Philip Sidney Game: A Simple Model of Biological Signaling"
(1992) 156 J. Theor. Biol. 215; M. Lachmann & C.T. Bergstrom, "Signaling Among Relatives.
II. Beyond the Tower of Babel" (1998) 54 Theoretical Population Biology 146; P.L. Hurd,
"Communication in Discrete Action-Response Games" (1995) 174 J. Theor. Biol. 217; S.
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largely from Spence's earlier work in the economic literature.1 2 Posner, however,
further honed the idea, applying it exclusively to the communication of discount
rates in relation to social norms."' Some of the research in the CST literature may
be of help and thus is brought into the discussion below.
D. Why would Inefficient Norms be selected for?
To reiterate: Evolution produces the tendency to internalize any norm that functions
as a signal of a discount rate. The norms' specific content (beyond its role as a dis-
count rate signal), however, is unimportant. This explains why many norms of a
non-functional variety might be inefficient even under an evolutionary model: what
has been selected for are not the norms themselves, but the general predisposition
to internalize norms. The norms themselves may still give rise to inefficiencies
in particular instances, a fact cited by many norm theorists,114 however, taken as
a whole, the tendency to internalize norms confers a distinct survival advantage.
Indeed, a norm can be evolutionarily stable, and yet not Pareto-efficient."
While "many social norms," Posner writes, "contribute to social welfare, many
social norms harm social welfare ... "6 Indeed he goes on to assert bluntly that,
"Functionalism-the view that social practices and norms are efficient or adaptive
in some way-is empirically false and methodologically sterile."' ' INot all norms
are necessarily efficiency-enhancing."' We simply "cannot conclude that societies
will opt for efficient norms. It is doubtful, for example, that norms of retribution
are efficient, or that pushing is superior to queuing. Yet these are the operative
norms in quite a few cases.""' Deploying concepts borrowed from evolutionary
game theory, Paul Mahoney and Chris Sanchirico show that "efficient norms will
prevail only in certain settings and not others ... "120, concluding that positive legal
Szimad6, "The Validity of the Handicap Principle in Discrete Action-Response Games" (1998)
198 J. Theor. Biol. 593; G. Noldeke & L. Samuelson, "How Costly is the Honest Signaling of
Need?" (1999) 197 J. Theor. Biol. 527; R.A. Johnstone, "Sexual Selection, Honest Advertisement
and the Handicap Principle: Reviewing the Evidence" (1995) 70 Biological Reviews 1; Gintis,
supra note 72; Francis T. McAndrew, "New Evolutionary Perspectives on Altruism: Multilevel-
Selection and Costly-Signaling Theories" (2002) 11 Current Directions In Psychological Science
79; Gintis, Smith & Bowles, supra note 103; Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, "The Nature of
Human Altruism" (2003) 425 Nature 785 at 785; James L..Boone, "The Evolution of
Magnanimity: When is it Better to give than to Receive?" (1998) 9 Human Nature 1; Samuel
Bowles & Herbert Gintis, "Can Self-Interest Explain Cooperation?" (2005) 2 Evol. Inst. Econ.
Rev. 21; Smith & Bliege Bird, supra note 108.
112. Spence, supra note I 10.
113. Posner, supra note 5.
114. Posner, supra note 3; see also Paul Mahoney & Chris William Sanchirico, "Competing Norms
and Social Evolution: Is the Fittest Norm Efficient?" (2001) 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2027; Posner,
supra note 5 at 169-84; Sugden, supra note 98; Bicchieri, supra note 33 at 838.
115. Sugden, supra note 98 at 93.
116. Posner, supra note 5 at 8.
117. Ibid at 172.
118. H. Peyton Young, "Social Norms" 6 (University of Oxford, Department of Economics, Discussion
Paper Series No. 307, 2007).
119. Ibid.
120. Mahoney et al., supra note 114 at 2027.
26
Law, Selfishness, and Signals
institutions are in fact required to periodically correct inefficiencies.121 In their view,
"survival of the fittest does not imply survival of the efficient."'22 Sugden argues
that normative patterns of behavior are not "necessarily efficient" nor "serve any
overarching social purpose; thus they cannot, in general, be justified in terms of any
system of morality that sees society as having an overall objective or welfare func-
tion." I23 Elster also regards many norms as dysfunctional,'24 concluding that the func-
tionalist argument is dubious; the beneficial nature of norms is not always clear.'25
Even in situations where a norm can be said to be welfare enhancing, such as dis-
tribution, retribution and cooperation, it is usually not the sole means that end can
be achieved.'26 A great many social norms are "underdetermined with respect to the
collective objectives they may serve, nor can they be ordered according to a criterion
of greater or lesser efficiency in meeting these goals."'27
Theorists who assert that evolutionary and rational choice explanations of nor-
mative behavior are compatible in that natural selection directly shapes preference
formation 28 (the present model does this but it adopts a very different approach)
often point to the universality of norms against murder, theft and cannibalism across
cultures in support of this view.'29 However, sociobiological theory remains fun-
damentally difficult to square with rational choice explanations "since evolution
can produce behaviors, such as those related to altruism ... that seem 'irrational'
from the point of view of maximizing individual utility."' Our tipping tourist is
one such example. Indeed, it is a daunting task to "draw on evolutionary biology
in order to show that efficient norms are adaptive."'
1. Inefficient Norms: The example of Seppuku
Consider the example of seppuku, the Japanese Samurai tradition of ritual suicide
by disembowelment.'32 How could such a social norm evolve? To be sure, it provides
little in the way of survival advantage (to say the least). Indeed, one would think
121. Ibid. at 2062.
122. Ibid at 2027.
123. Sugden, supra note 98 at 97.
124. Elster, supra note 13 at 125-51.
125. Elster, supra note 81 at 88.
126. Bicchieri, supra note 64 at 838.
127. Ibid.
128. Eric A. Smith & Bruce Winterhalder, "Natural Selection and Decision Making: Some
Fundamental Principles" in Eric A. Smith & Bruce Winterhalder, eds., Evolutionary Ecology
and Human Behavior (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1992) 49; see also J. Hirshleifer, "Economics
from a Biological Viewpoint" (1977) 20 J. L. Econ. 1; Hirshleifer, supra note 79; J. Hirshleifer,
Economic Behavior in Adversity (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1987).
129. Posner, supra note 114 at 1723.
130. Nielsen, supra note 76 at 271.
131. Posner, supra note 114 at 1723.
132. A description of the act: "A samurai committing seppuku is expected to stab the left side of his
abdomen first and then slit it open sideways. In the process he will also cut and slit the internal
organs, causing excruciating pain. It usually takes hours before one dies successfully, thereby
prolonging the excruciating pain and requiring a superhuman courage and perseverance."
Toyomasa Fus6, "Suicide and Culture in Japan: A Study of Seppuku as an Institutionalized Form
of Suicide" (1980) 15 Social Psychiatry 57 at 61.
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a norm of this nature would be a leading candidate to be selected out of human
psychology."' Similarly, norms that encourage substance abuse, smoking, celibacy,
suicide bombing, extreme dieting, and the like would likewise fall into this category.
The question is why then from an evolutionary perspective would norms so patently
inefficient be selected for? However, when we uncouple the specific content of
the norm from the normative act, the issue resolves itself. The specifics of the norm
are not what are selected for, rather it is the general act of signaling.
One could of course argue that Seppuku is simply a case of a more general norm
such as honor or duty, evolutionarily efficient in isolation, run amok (the same argu-
ment could be made for smoking and suicide bombers).'34 However, if we are will-
ing to step back from the specific norm arguing that a more general norm underpins
it, we are intellectually obligated to not stop at this level of analysis, but retreat fur-
ther and survey the origin of even this more general norm. Though the path might
be winding it ultimately leads back to the simple act of signaling discount rates.
The point I wish to make here is that our analysis need not go further then the core
function of these norms as base signals-nature's normative code.
2. The Evidence
There is a wealth of evidence that strongly supports the contention that while we
have a tendency to internalize norms, this is not specific to the norm itself. First,
the variance between cultures in terms of the content of norms strongly suggests
this. Ethnographic research shows that norms are a cultural universal."' Indeed,
norms are found in all cultures without fail.'36 However, while "norms are present
in all human groups, one of the most striking facts about them is that the contents
of the norms which prevail in different groups are quite variable.""' As Elster
explains, "Although the emotions that sustain social norms seem to be universal,
the behavior targeted by these norms varies from one group to another.""' Indeed,
many cultural norms are stunningly arbitrary or downright bizarre; consider the
ancient Chinese practice of female foot binding or ritual sacrifice among the Incas."'
In American culture, for example, a basket on a bicycle is for some reason asso-
ciated with femininity; even certain colors have been assigned to the genders (pink
and blue). The fact that while the majority of social norms are highly arbitrary, all
133. But we need not look so far, there are similar norms that are more familiar to the western reader,
such as the practice of dueling in the American South. See Lawrence Lessig, "The Regulation
of Social Meaning" (1995) 62 U. Chicago L. Rev. 943 at 971-72.
134. Indeed, seppuku has been explained as being caused by "intense socialization into and dedication
to, one's social role." Fus6, supra note 132.
135. E. Sober & D.S. Wilson, Unto Others: Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998) at 165; S. Roberts, Order and Dispute: An
Introduction to Legal Anthropology (London: Martin Robertson, 1979); D. Brown, Human
Universals (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991).
136. Chandra Sekjar Sripada & Stephen Stich, "A Framework for the Psychology of Norms" in Peter
Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen P. Stich, eds., The Innate Mind: Culture and Cognition
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 280 at 282.
137. Ibid.
138. Elster, supra note 81 at 98.
139. Cialdini & Trost, supra note 103 at 151.
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cultures have a propensity to develop norms, suggests that although the tendency
to internalize norms is universal, this is largely unrelated to the specific subject
matter of the norm.'40 In fact, social groups often generate norms that are contra-
dictory. Some cultures develop a norm for queuing, others for pushing. Elster writes,
" ... the actions prescribed or proscribed by the norms vary enormously across
groups. Thus norms of vengeance may be contrasted with the norm of turning the
other cheek ... ."141 Norms often "conflict even in the same place. They conflict
when different groups-often a dominant group and various subgroups-live in
the same town or city. Indeed, the norms of one group often require a behavior that
another group's norms forbid "142 The same applies to different historical periods
of even the same society. Norms regarding slavery in the United States in 1810
are profoundly different from 2010. Norms related to environmentalism and the
tolerance of homosexuality have shifted dramatically in just the last two decades.
Nevertheless, research shows that social norms demonstrate a "reliable pattern
ofontogenesis. Regardless of their biological heritage, almost everyone ... acquires
the norms that prevail in the local cultural group in a highly reliable way."'43 It makes
no difference at all if the norm concerns foot binding, necks rings,'" gender roles,
the wearing of ties, queuing, or pushing; "In no human group is it the case that some
individuals reliably acquire the prevailing norms while many others don't."45
Arguments based on efficiency, functionalism, universality, or an appeal to some
other guiding mechanism tied explicitly to the content of the norm itself is difficult
to reconcile with this sociological fact. The reader might respond that, while this
is true, some norms do appear to be universal, and persistent over time, such as
the prohibition against theft, murder, and cannibalism.'46 This is true, but only in
a limited sense. There are certain "norms which one sees again and again in almost
all human societies, [however] in order to discern these commonalities, one has
to stay at a fairly high level of generality."'47 Thus, while there are, broadly speaking,
"certain high-level commonalities in the norms that prevail across groups, as one
looks at norms in more detail it is clear that there is tremendous variability in the
specific rules one finds in-different groups." 4 8
This commonality of certain norms when viewed from a very general level, and
the arbitrary and culturally specific nature of others can be explained. Social norms
that are universal are not related to the content of the norm per se; their universality
rather is connected to the inherent signaling quality that underpins the act. The level
of generality that must be maintained in order to discern universals is a reflection
140. Sripada et al., supra note 136 at 282.
141. Elster, supra note 81 at 101.
142. McAdams, supra note 2 at 637.
143. Sripada et al., supra note 136 at 285; see also Benjamin Kilborne & Lewis L. Langness, eds.,
Culture and Human Nature: Theoretical Papers of Melford E. Spiro (New Brunswick, NJ:
Transaction Publishers, 1994) at 136.
144. See Edith T. Mirante, Burmese Looking Glass: A Human Rights Adventure and a Jungle
Revolution (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1993).
145. Sripada et al., supra note 136 at 285.
146. Posner, supra note 114 at 1723.
147. Sripada et al., supra note 136 at 284.
148. Ibid. at 283.
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of the general nature of the discount rate signal latent in the behavior. The specific
rules of these norms may vary, but they are virtually universal because they intrin-
sically express an actor's general discount rate. For instance, the act of theft implic-
itly signals a high discount rate, so it is unsurprising to find norms related to this
behavior present in all cultures. Though the specifics may vary, in its broad strokes
it should be ubiquitously present. The same holds true for physical assault, murder,
cannibalism and so forth. These acts implicitly convey a discount rate signal. After
all, what is a greater indication of a disinterest in long-term cooperation then killing
and eating the other person? Other social norms, most social norms, do not intrin-
sically communicate any discount rate but nevertheless evolved as signals. These
norms form a wider outer ring of relatively benign behaviors-table manners, shak-
ing hands, wearing a nose ring-that have been latched onto and co-opted to serve
a signaling function. As a result, these norms are often quite arbitrary, and can even
be mutually contradictory.
Secondly, the idea that we have an innate tendency towards certain norms is
unpersuasive and contradicted by empirical research. We have an innate tendency
to internalize norms; however, the norm's content (beyond the discount rate it
expresses) seems to be of less importance: "If there were innate norms ... then they
would almost certainly be cultural universals."'49 Norms should be identical across
cultures, or in the very least, non-contradictory. Indeed, we should "expect to find
them in all human groups ... "'oHowever, " ... the ethnographic and historical evi-
dence does not support the existence of such exceptionless universals.""' The pro-
duction of norms is universal, but they are not universal in content. What this
suggests is "that there are innate psychological mechanisms specialized for the
acquisition and implementation of norms ."'5 While norms differ widely in nature,
"the existence of these mechanisms would help explain the universal presence of
norms in all human groups."'
There is ample psychological evidence that norms are not innate, but are rather
acquired during early childhood.'54 Sharing for instance is not innate in small chil-
dren."' Children begin to demonstrate norm internalization between three and five
years of age."' This is attributed to a process of social learning, parental discipline
being a major factor."' The child reliably "models his behavior in accordance with
149. Ibid. at 299.
150. Ibid.
151. Ibid.
152. Ibid. at 282.
153. Ibid.
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157. See Robert D. Cooter, "Law and Unified Social Theory" (1995) 22 J.L. & Soc'y. 50 at 61. Cooter
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the consequence of childhood memory of parental punishment. See Sigmund Freud, The Ego
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[the parent's] norms."'" By the age of ten, almost all children have developed an
understanding of fairness as basic reciprocity.' However, "it is not until middle
to late adolescence that children develop a coordinated understanding of conven-
tions as constituent elements of social systems ... [children] seem disconnected
from society's rules even when their normative content [e.g., "Don't talk with your
mouth full."] has been repeatedly presented to them."" Particular normative beliefs
are a product of social learning.
Thirdly, the sheer malleability of normative beliefs undermines the claim that
norms are somehow innate. Group conformity regarding social norms is well doc-
umented, even at an internalized level.'"' Early studies on conformity by S.E. Ache
and Muzafer Sherif demonstrated the extent to which an individual conforms to
the norms of the larger group.'62 Sherif's autokinetic study in particular deals with
private perceptual-cognitive change-internalization. When subjects with mis-
matched perceptions regarding the movement of a small red dot on screen were
placed together in groups of 2 or 3 and randomly asked to say aloud the degree
of movement they saw, the initial difference in judgments began to disappear, such
that the subjects' responses gradually converged becoming very similar as they
repeated the exercise.' When later retested alone, subjects did not revert back to
their previous judgments but rather continued to exhibit these new perceptions.'"
The effect was found to be extremely resilient, continuing to influence their indi-
vidual judgments up to a year later.'65
To a great extent, our preferences are socially programmable. ' Norms and values
"are incorporated into individual preference functions through the sociological mech-
anism [of] socialization and the psychological mechanism [of] the internalization
ofnonns."'6 ' The effectiveness of propaganda and marketing campaigns at shaping
public opinion, and group-related phenomenon such as: herd effect, groupthink,
behavioral contagion, group pressure, imitation, observational learning, suggestion,
vicarious conditioning, social influence, all speak to the pliability of normative
beliefs. There is now growing research that suggests humans are neurologically pre-
disposed to modify their beliefs in line with their group environment.'8
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There is little doubt that internalized normative beliefs are shaped by external
pressures. Research regarding conformity has established this. At best one could
argue that we have innate norms that are then subject to later influence. But the
case for this is seriously weakened by the fact that even these norms, as discussed
above, seem to be the product of social learning during childhood. Rather it would
appear we do not have innate norms at all; individuals are socialized towards their
normative convictions. While the tendency to internalize norms is indeed innate,
the norms we end up internalizing are by no means fixed; they are highly dependent
upon the individual's social environment.
All this points to one fact: the internalization of norms and the content of norms
are largely separate things. This lends plausibility to the supposition that internal-
ization is driven by other, more general factors unrelated to the particulars of norms,
namely that we have an innate tendency to internalize norms in relation to the
strength of the discount signal that underlies the act. Normative behavior signals
a particular discount rate ranging from low to high. The relentless pulse of these
binary signals of cooperation and opportunism-gives rise to an intricate matrix
of normative beliefs. While a particular norm might exhibit astounding complexity
and cultural nuance, we need not concern ourselves with this at all. The norm itself
is of secondary importance. This baffling complexity emerges from simplicity-the
internalization of discount rate signals. Individuals have been conditioned to inter-
nalize the act of signaling, though the specific norms this adaptation produces may
prove evolutionarily inefficient in particular instances, as in the case of seppuku
highlighted above. Indeed, evolutionary forces can sometimes generate traits that
are maladaptive.169 However, the internalization of signals provides an overall net
survival benefit-indeed, it is instrumental to survival as it is through this process
that the individual is able to identify cooperative partners.
3. How this Model can be used to answer some key criticisms plaguing
Functionalism and Sociobiology
I do not wish to wander too far from the focus of our discussion; however, the pre-
sent model, in fact, answers some key criticisms plaguing functionalism in general
and sociobiology in particular. Let us briefly note it here and move on.
V Klucharev et al., Reinforcement Learning Signal Predicts Social Conformity (2009) 61 Neuron
140; B. Wild, M. Erb, & M. Bartels, "Are Emotions Contagious? Evoked Emotions While
Viewing Emotionally Expressive Faces: Quality, Quantity, Time Course and Gender Differences"
(2001) 102 Psychiatry Res. 109; L. Nummenmaa et al., "Is Emotional Contagion Special? An
MRI Study on Neural Systems for Affective and Cognitive Empathy" (2008) 43 Neuroimage
571; A. E. Guyer., "Probing the Neural Correlates of Anticipated Peer Evaluation in Adolescence"
(2009) 80 Child Dev. 1000; see also Antonio Damasio, Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and
the Human Brain (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1994) at 173-80.
169. Posner, supra note 3 at 1724. Norms that are fitness-reducing for the group and/or the indi-
vidual may nevertheless persist. See R. Boyd & P. Richerson, "Punishment Allows the
Evolution of Cooperation (or anything else) in Sizeable Groups" (1992) 13 Ethol. Sociobiol.
171; R.B. Edgerton, Sick Societies: Challenging the Myth ofPrimitive Harmony (New York:
Free Press, 1992).
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(a) The Problem of Group Selection
Above, we noted the more obvious problem for functionalism: that many norms
are not actually welfare enhancing at all, but rather are harmful to the group.'
However, another difficulty with the functionalist contention that social norms pro-
mote the survival of the group and are therefore selected for-an idea promoted
by such people as Bronislaw Malinowski, Robert Merton, Talcott Parsons, Emile
Durkheim and even to some extent, Eugen Ehrlich and Friedrich Hayek"'-is that
most biologists now conclude that evolution selects either genes or individual organ-
isms, not groups as a whole.'72 This is a problem. As Robert Ellickson explains,
if we assume for instance that, "honesty is a functional norm in the sense that, if
all the members of a group were consistently honest, they would each be better
off than if everyone were consistently dishonest ... [a] dishonest individual living
in an environment of honest people might especially prosper, surrounded by easy
marks."73 Thus, evolution would in fact tend to select dishonest individuals (note
the prisoner's dilemma dynamic). On the grand level of society, the norm may be
collectively beneficial, but on the individual level, the opposite may be true. Current
gene-based evolutionary theories simply cannot account for patterns of human
behavior such as altruism.'74 Selection only operates on the level of the individual,
not the group as a collective entity."'
The present model in a sense sidesteps this entire problem by applying selection
not to the norm itself, but rather to the signal that underpins it. Assuming even a
modicum of repeated interaction, broadcasting a low-discount rate will always be
evolutionarily advantageous on the level of the individual actor. There is no need
170. See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
171. Bronislaw Malinowski, Crime and Custom in Savage Society (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld,
1985 [1926]); Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, 3rd ed. (New York: Free
Press, 1968 (1957)) at 1-84; Talcott Parsons, The Social System (London: Routledge, 1951); Emile
Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, trans. by George Simpson (New York: The Free
Press, 1933) at 49-229; Eugen Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1936); Friedrich A. Hayek, The Constitution of
Liberty (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1978) at 36; see also John W Thibaut & Harold
H. Kelley, The Social Psychology of Groups (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1959) at 135-42.
172. See, e.g., Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976) at 8-12;
Edward 0. Wilson, Sociobiology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975) at 106-29;
J. Maynard Smith, "Group Selection and Kin Selection" (1964) 201 Nature 1145; G.C. Williams,
Adaptation and Natural Selection: A Critique ofSome Current Evolutionary Thought (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996); VC. Wynne-Edwards, Evolution Through Group Selection
(Oxford: Blackwell Scientific Publications, 1986). However, group selection theories have recently
seen a minor resurgence although not as a fundamental mechanism for selection. Multi-level
selection theory (MST) has been proposed as an evolutionary model that supports group selection.
See D.S. Wilson & E. Sober, "Reintroducing Group Selection to the Human Behavioral Sciences"
(1994) 17 Behavioral and Brain Sciences 585; D.S. Wilson & E.O. Wilson, "Evolution "for the
good of the group" (2008) 96 American Scientist 378; See also J.H. Koeslag, "Sex, the Prisoner's
Dilemma Game, and the Evolutionary Inevitability of Cooperation" (1997) 189 J. Theor. Biol.
53; M.J. Wade, "An Experimental Study of Group Selection" (1977) 31 Evolution 134; J.H.
Koeslag, "Evolution of Cooperation: Cooperation Defeats Defection in the Cornfield Model"
(2003) 224 J. Theor. Biol. 399.
173. Ellickson, supra note I at 152.
174. Fehr & Fischbacher, supra note 111.
175. Dawkins, supra note 172; Wilson, supra note 172; Smith, supra note 172.
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to resort to the aggregate effects of a specific norm on society as a whole. While
functionalism attempts to find rationality in norms with reference to the entire
group, the present theory accounts for norms with reference to the individual only.
Thus, to use Ellickson's example of honesty: dishonesty will not be selected for
because as a signal it will be immediately detrimental to the individual in that it
will prevent her from securing any cooperative partners as she will not be emitting
the correct signals. Thus, we do not need to look to the group; just two individuals
interacting within the group is enough to provide a positive benefit from observing
the norm, as the norm confers immediate value in its role as a signal (a value that
only increases as the audience grows). Norms may be explained with reference to
just the individual. Explanations involving collective group benefit are not required.
Because any costly action, even seemingly nonsensical ones, can serve as discount
rate signals, there is positive incentive for individuals to perform the action inde-
pendent of any group benefit. The individual's constant hunt for new cooperative
partners relies on these signals. In the costly signal theory literature discussed ear-
lier, Herbert Gintis et al. propose costly signaling as a potential explanation of altru-
istic behavior (what they call strong reciprocity)."' However, the advantage here
is that this explanatory model can be applied to all norms, not just patently altruistic
behavior--even norms of a completely arbitrary nature, such as facing the front
of the elevator or using both hands to give money."' The fitness enhancing quality
of norms resides in their use as signals of discount rates. Insofar as they effectively
achieve this end, they will proliferate. But what is selected for is merely the inter-
nalization of norms that serve as suitable signals, not the norm itself-it is not the
behavior itself that is genetically transmitted, as evolutionary psychology and socio-
biology might have us believe.
(b) The Problem of Reification
This brings us directly to our second problem, which relates to the sheer com-
plexity of social norms. This is referred to as a "reification" fallacy."' The
charge often leveled at sociobiology is that behavioral dispositions like altru-
ism cannot be contained in a gene, as altruism is an abstraction. 9 Complex
behavior, the argument runs, cannot be compartmentalized into units that can
then simply be assigned to genes-such behavior simply does not correspond
neatly to a set of controlling genes.'s As there is no gene for the human hand,
176. Gintis et al., supra note 103; see also McAndrew, supra note 111; Fehr & Fischbacher, supra
note Ill at 789.
177. Using both hands when presenting someone with money or a gift is a norm in some parts of
China. Having lived in China for the better part of decade, I personally internalized this norm.
178. R.C. Lewontin, "Sociobiology-A of Darwinism" (1976) 2 Philosophy of Science Association
22 at 24; see also Steven Rose, Leon J. Kamin & R.C. Lewontin, Not in our Genes: Biology,
Ideology and Human Nature (New York: Pantheon, 1984) at 248; Richard Lewontin, It Ain't
Necessarily So: The Dream of the Human Genome and Other Illusions (New York: New York
Review of Books, 2001).
179. Lewontin, supra note 178.
180. Michael Ruse, Sociobiology: Sense or Nonsense?, 2nd ed. (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1985)
at 103.
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it is highly unlikely that there is one gene, for instance, for altruism or
reciprocity.'"'
Geneticists long ago abandoned the naive notion that there are genes for toes, genes
for ankles, genes for the lower leg, genes for the kneecap, etc. Yet the sociobiologists
break the totality of human social behavior into arbitrary units, call these elements
"organs" of behavior, and postulate particular genes or gene complexes for each."2
The confusion is "whether it is sensible to talk of the "evolution of the hand" as
opposed to, say, the evolution of the fingers, or of the separate parts of the fingers,
or of the entire limb."' The chin, for instance, in a sense, does not exist; it is com-
posed of separate components (the alveolar and the mandibular).'" There is no gene
for the chin.'" Genes work on a much simpler level.
What is true of anatomy is also true for abstract social behavior. It is highly
implausible that complex normative behavior can be reduced to a particular gene.
It just seems improbable that a norm related to xenophobia, for instance, is an evo-
lutionary trait as sociobiologists contend.'"' Indeed, the general claim that humans
have genetically influenced norms hard-wired into our character starts to appear
rather tenuous.'" This is a distinct challenge for the field of sociobiology.
Sociobiology rests on the premise that there "must be genes whose action is nearly
entirely concerned with the formation of the trait so that genetic variation for the
trait can occur ... [o]therwise the so-called 'trait' is an arbitrary unit of description
of the organism with no relation to the direct forces of evolution."' 8 Indeed, this
has lead some to acerbically declare that such science "is dead but doesn't seem
to know it yet."'
The present model may be of some help here. Just as genes work on a simpler
level, but combine together to form grosser constructions, normative tendencies
181. Lewontin, supra note 178 at 25. Some critics of evolutionary psychology claim that there simply
aren't enough genes to code for a large number of innate cognitive adaptations. See Paul Ehrlich
& Marcus Feldman, "Genes and Cultures: What Creates Our Behavioral Phenome?" (2003) 44
Current Anthropology 87.
182. Sociobiology Study Group, "Sociobiology-A New Biological Determinism" in The Ann Arbor
Science for the People Editorial Collective, eds., in Biology as a Social Weapon (Minneapolis,
MN: Burgess Publishing Company, 1977) 134 at 143.
183. Lewontin, supra note 178 at 25.
184. Ibid.
185. Ibid.
186. Ibid.
187. For an example of some scholars who make such claims, see, e.g., George Edwin Pugh, The
Biological Origin ofHuman Values (London: Routledge, 1977); Charles L. Lumsden & Edward
0. Wilson, Promethean Fire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983); in the field of
economics, see A. Schotter, The Economic Theory ofSocial Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1981) at 160-64; Paul H. Rubin, "Evolved Ethics and Efficient Ethics" (1982)
3 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 161; closer to the field of law, see Jack Hirshleifer, "Privacy: Its Origin,
Function, and Future" (1980) 9 J. Legal Stud. 649; see also Owen D. Jones & Timothy H.
Goldsmith, "Law and Behavioral Biology" (2005) 105 Colum. L. Rev. 405; Richard A. Epstein,
"A Taste for Privacy? Evolution and the Emergence of a Naturalistic Ethic" (1980) 9 J. Legal
Stud. 665.
188. Lewontin, supra note 178 at 25.
189. Evolutionist Paul R. Ehrlich referring to evolutionary psychology. Edward H. Hagen,
"Controversial Issues in Evolutionary Psychology" in David M. Buss, ed., The Handbook of
Evolutionary Psychology (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2005) 151.
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work on simple the level of signals. All norms, no matter how outwardly complex,
can be reduced to signals expressing a discount rate. For instance, we can speak
of norms regarding courting, such as a man bringing flowers for his date, just as
we do the human chin, or we can speak on the more fundamental level of signals,
and conceptualize the complex and arbitrary norms of behavior as basic discount
rate signals. The flower ritual, or buying dinner, or even an engagement ring-is
merely a low-discount rate signal." Again, there is no genetic transmission of the
norm itself, norms may arise as the result of any number of factors ranging from
the historical, technological, to sheer chance; however, there is an evolved tendency
to internalize norms in that they act as signals. The ability to work with signals
provides a distinct survival advantage and thus does evolve in response to selection
pressures. We need not concern ourselves with how norms are genetically trans-
mitted-they are not. The inclination to internalize signals, however, is. This mas-
sive simplification makes the sociobiological argument far more plausible. There
is no need to identify a vast array of genes that carry complex normative behavior,
just a genetic trait that promotes the internalization of discount rate signals. Most
of sociobiology's contentious assumptions regarding the modularity of cognitive,
psychological, and neurophysiological systems are no longer required."'
(c) The problem of Genetic Transmission
Indeed, the present model offers a plausible account of how survival traits are passed
on without the need to resort to complex biological explanations: we merely have
an evolutionary tendency to internalize norms that serve as signals because doing
so confers an individual survival advantage, we thus internalize the prevailing nor-
mative signals of whatever network we find ourselves in. Norms that emerge as
standard signals then reproduce themselves through a process of cultural inheritance
and social learning within a network. 92 There is research that supports the idea that
we have a genetic propensity to internalize signals. Gintis, for instance, formally
models the supposition that if "there is one genetic locus that controls the capacity
to internalize norms," then the allele for internalization of certain fitness-enhancing
norms may be evolutionarily stable.'" However, the present model goes beyond
this in not requiring a norm to be fitness-enhancing in the conventional sense.
Indeed, the requirements are extraordinarily minimal. A norm's evolutionary value
rests simply in its effectiveness as a discount rate signal and no more. Signal inter-
nalization is adaptive, not necessarily the norm itself. As a result, a haphazard array
of culturally idiosyncratic norms may emerge as standard signals within a particular
network of actors and be passed on-any norm that is a signal is adaptive. This
190. See Posner, supra note 5 at 71.
191. In terms of human normative behavior.
192. For social learning, see A. Bandura, Social Learning Theory (Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall,
1977) (giving an overview of theoretical and experimental advances in the field of social learning);
see also T.R. Zentall, "Imitation: Definitions, Evidence, and Mechanisms" (2006) 9 Animal
Cognition 335 (presenting an overview of various types of social learning).
193. Gintis, supra note 72 at 407. See also R. O'Gorman, D. Wilson & R. Miller, "An Evolved
Cognitive Bias for Social Norms" (2008) 29 Evolution & Human Behavior 71.
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would explain why, while some norms are virtually universal (due to their inherent
signaling value), many norms are peculiar to specific groups of people and appear
highly arbitrary (they just emerged as signaling standards).
The only biological component to this explanation is an evolved tendency to
internalize discount rate signals. This bears some resemblance to Dual Inheritance
Theory (DIT) or Gene-Culture Coevolution. However, the genetic aspect here
is pared down to an extraordinarily parsimonious model-individuals are merely
conditioned to recognize and emit simple discount rate signals in whatever form
they present themselves. These signals are profoundly binary in nature-coop-
erator or non-cooperator, partner or competitor. With the highly nuanced com-
plexity of normative behavior replaced with simple high-low discount rate signals,
the proposition that there may have evolved a genetic inclination to internalize
specific norms (in their capacity as discount rate signals) becomes far more plau-
sible-indeed likely.
From the point of view of evolution, the general tendency to internalize norms
provides a distinct survival advantage (efficiently utilizing discount rate signals),
thus it was selected for. While inefficient norms might sporadically materialize,
overall, internalization is adaptive. The reason some norms are virtually universal
across cultures is due to their inherent signaling nature (after all, as pointed out
above, what is a clearer signal of one's uncooperative character than say eating the
other person?). Norms that do not have an inherent signaling value but nevertheless
evolved into signals, tend to vary from culture to culture, and over space and time.
This explanation does not account so much for why there are the particular norms
that there are; rather, it explains why there are social norms at all-norms as a gen-
eral signaling tool provide a crucial survival benefit. As a consequence, we have
evolved the propensity to internalize social norms so as to effectively (and mostly
unwittingly) signal our cooperative potential to prospective economic partners.
E. Would not Bad-Types also evolve a predisposition to internalize Low
Discount Rate Signals?
Still there is another question that we must address here: if signaling a low discount
rate confers a survival advantage, why do bad-types not also internalize these
norms? Again, the answer is that only the general tendency to internalize norms
is selected for, not the norm itself Thus, bad-types internalize norms commensurate
194. The basic premise of Dual Inheritance Theory is that human behavior evolves through both
genetic and cultural processes. For Dual Inheritance Theory, see C. Lumsden & E. Wilson, Genes,
Mind and Culture: The Coevolutionary Process (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1981) (formulating a series of mathematical models for how genes and culture might coevolve);
L. Cavalli-Sforza & M. Feldman, Cultural Transmission and Evolution: A Quantitative Approach
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981) (presenting a mathematical theory concerning
the spread of cultural traits); R. Boyd & P. Richerson, Culture and the Evolutionary Process
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1985) (examining the relationship between culture
as a transmission system and genetic evolution); see also Peter J. Richerson & Robert Boyd, Not
by Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago
Press, 2004) (presenting an excellent overview of the current state of cultural evolution research).
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with the (equally advantageous) survival strategy they have adopted in the "society
game"-opportunism. So long as there remains a substantial body of cooperators
to exploit, opportunism presents itself as an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS).'"
It is, in a sense, a parasitic strategy."' Opportunism (or degrees of it) thus calls for
a different intensity of internalization so as to avoid troublesome moral conflicts
that may prove disruptive to the strategy.
This brings me to my last claim: The degree to which a player internalizes a sig-
nal will thus correspond with their discount rate. If an individual values long-term
cooperation with a particular network, i.e. has a low discount rate, the intensity with
which she will internalize that network's norms will be commensurate with the
importance she places upon this cooperation. The lower one's discount rate, the more
intensely one will internalize the norms of the network with which one is a part.
This will manifest simply as a desire to be part of the group, to belong. Conversely,
the higher one's discount rate in relation to a particular group, the less inclined one
is to internalize their normative values. A strong emotional need to belong will not
arise. Individuals with low discount rates, and who are thus better cooperators, will,
for example, tend to see flag waving on the fourth of July and commitment to country
as a noble thing (assuming that is the low-discount signal within their network).'97
Conversely, those with higher-discount rates will be far less moved by such senti-
ments. This claim is not as wild as it may appear. On the contrary, it is quite intuitive.
It makes sense that an individual who is prone to cooperation will be more apt to
internalize the norms of the group with which she frequently interacts, as this
enhances her ability to engage in cooperation with that group.
Depending upon the normative standard in their network, low-discount rate play-
ers might deeply internalize and thus earnestly attach great importance to norms
related to table manners, as with a socialite for instance, while an individual pos-
sessing a high-discount rate in the same network, despite paying lip service to the
norm, might privately scoff at the "inanity" of salad forks. While most law pro-
fessors have internalized the norm against plagiarism, a professional wrestler will
likely not have internalized the norm quite as deeply. People with low-discount rates
are evolutionarily conditioned to "appreciate" norms that signal low discount rates
in their network, as doing so supports their game strategy; individuals with high
discount rates are less inclined to internalize such norms, because doing so, like-
wise, supports their survival strategy.
It would be a mistake, however, to slot this into simple moral categories.
Evolution has conditioned individuals to internalize norms to varying degrees in
195. For the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), see Smith, supra note 77.
196. The existence of sociopaths, perhaps the quintessential pure opportunist, attests to the viability
of a non-cooperative strategy in evolutionary game theoretical terms. Sociopaths comprise a siz-
able percentage of the population, roughly 3-4% of the male population and approximately 1%
of the female population. G.C. Davison & J.M. Neale, Abnormal Psychology, 6th ed., (New York:
John Wiley & Sons, 1994); L.N. Robins, J. Tipp & T. Przybeck, "Antisocial Personality" in L.N.
Robins & D.A. Regier, eds., Psychiatric Disorders in America (New York: Free Press, 1991)
258. Sociopaths demonstrate a "marked degree of impulsivity," which makes sense for an indi-
vidual with an enormously high discount rate. See Mealey, supra note 82 at 134.
197. See Posner, supra note 5 at 112-19.
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relation to their discount rates, but this should not be confused with a definitive
propensity for moral behavior. The average SS officer certainly possessed a very
low-discount rate, and was an excellent cooperator. Both "flag wavers and flag
burners can show that they have low discount rates, and that they are good coop-
erators within their respective groups."'" Having a low discount rate only demon-
strates that one is a team player; however, the team may be quite wicked. That said,
discount rates are not entirely divorced from what in most circumstances is called
"moral" behavior. Because I incorporate internalization into my model, I diverge
significantly from Posner here. Posner goes to great pains to emphasize that his
"good-type" and "bad-type" classification does not imply a morally good or bad
individual.'" However, in the typical normative network a pure opportunist would
quite likely be seen as morally reprehensible. Of course, networks may arise that
espouse quite different normative standards, a band of murderers for instance, a
criminal gang, a murderous cult, and so forth. In such cases the behavior of an
opportunist might ironically end up appearing quite decent by conventional stan-
dards (this idea of conflicting norm networks emerges as a central topic later in
the discussion). However, a player with a high discount rate implies a proclivity
to not internalize cooperation norms, thus, this would usually translate into what
would commonly be defined as immoral behavior (in relation to the normative
standards of most networks). Even within "deviant" networks, such as criminal
gangs, norms of an explicitly immoral nature will seldom arise in regards to their
own internal interactions. Indeed, bands of cannibals that eat themselves do not
survive long.
1. Discount Rate will dictate Internalization Intensity
Again, my contention here is that an individual's discount rate will determine the
intensity with which a given norm is internalized, if at all. Finding themselves in
situations that call for particular dinner etiquette, for example, individuals with a
very low discount rate are more prone to develop a sense that these rules possess
a measure of normativity (this will develop over time). They possess this tendency
because this aids them in working with signals-it boosts their signaling profi-
ciency. The lower the discount rate, the more intensely the norm will be internalized.
Actors with a low discount rate are naturally more receptive to internalizing a norm.
Individuals have evolved a predisposition to internalize norms in line with their
discount rates, as this allows them to more efficiently engage in the signaling game.
To be sure, this relationship is somewhat of an oversimplification. Complicating
the issue, as Dan Kahan points out,2"o is the fact that the same individual might
exhibit different discount rates in different circumstances and with different groups
of people (their immediate family as opposed to colleagues at work for example).
198. Kristen Madison, "Government, Signaling, and Social Norms" (2001) 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 867
at 875.
199. See Posner, supra note 5 at 18.
200. Dan M. Kahan, "Signaling or Reciprocating? A Response to Eric Posner's Law and Social Norms"
(2002) 36 U. Rich. L. Rev. 367 at 374; see also Wendel, supra note 44 at 38.
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There is empirical evidence that this is the case.20' Thus an individual might deeply
internalize the norms of a certain group and yet hardly internalize the normative
beliefs of other networks (Posner does acknowledges this to some extent, but
defends the assumption that individuals possess a single discount rate as "a useful
simplification for expository purposes"2). While it might be tempting to conclude
that criminals who fail to internalize society's most serious norms are likely can-
didates to have a high discount rate, and are therefore less receptive to internal-
ization in all situations, such a conclusion would be misplaced. A mob enforcer,
for example, might flout society's most fundamental conventions while deeply inter-
nalizing the norms of his criminal organization. While a complication, this does
not, however, undermine the contention that a norm is internalized commensurate
with one's discount rate; it is simply one's discount rate in relation to that specific
group-as Kahan points out, it is "context specific."203 Although an individual will
exhibit a general discount rate, this might not be the case in certain instances and
in relation to certain groups. As Russell Hardin writes, "one might argue that people
are able to compartmentalize their behaviors and that I might be cooperative in some
contexts and not in others."2" The Expanded Signaling Model does not assume that
an individual's discount rate does not fluctuate depending on the group environment.
A criminal will exhibit a high discount rate in most situations, though not neces-
sarily in all situations. When people engage in the signaling game, they are con-
cerned with the discount rate the other party has in relation to them within the
context of the specific network they are both a part-their level of commitment
to that particular community. This idea of conflicting norm networks is examined
later where it is treated as the central topic of discussion.
2. The Evidence
My claim here is merely that the discount rate an individual possesses in relation
to the network she is in will determine the degree to which she will internalize
the norms of that network. The greater importance an individual places upon coop-
eration with a particular group, i.e. the higher her discount rate is in relation to
that group, the more she will tend to internalize that group's norms. Studies on
conformity strongly support this contention.205 When perceived interdependence,
and thus the value members place upon cooperation, increases in a group, nor-
mative conformity has been shown to be twice that of a noninterdependent group.20
Research shows individuals even "mimic the facial expressions, vocal expressions,
postures, and instrumental behaviors of those we value in order to enhance our
201. See, e.g., Thaler, supra note 42 at 92-106.
202. Posner, supra note 16 at 476.
203. Kahan, supra note 200.
204. Russell Hardin, "Law and Social Norms in the Large" (2000) 86 Va. L. Rev. 1821 at 1822.
205. See E.E. Jones, H.H. Wells & R. Torrey, "Some Effects of Feedback from the Experimenter on
Conformity Behaviour" (1958) 57 J. Abnormal and Social Psychology 207; J.W Thibaut & L.H.
Strickland, "Psychological Set and Social Conformity" (1956) 25 J. Personality 115.
206. M. Deutsch & H.G. Gerard, "A Study of Normative and Informational Social Influence upon
Individual Judgment" (1955) 51 J. Abnormal and Social Psychology 629.
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connection with them."207 One theory for the slight variance in conformity found
between cultures is that societies that require a high degree of interdependence,
such as non-industrialized high-food accumulating cultures, demonstrate more
intense levels of norm conformity.20 8
It would be interesting to empirically test the supposition that discount rates
determine the intensity of internalization more directly. While Posner suggests test-
ing his general thesis in a controlled environment,20 one could carry this further
and specifically examine the intensity of internalization. Indeed, it should be pos-
sible to conduct such a study if one could conclusively identify an individual's
approximate discount rate in a specific setting and construct a measure of how
deeply a norm is internalized, which although logistically challenging, seems pos-
sible. The hypothesis is therefore, in principle, experimentally falsifiable. Failing
this, however, even casual empirical observation seems to support the proposition
that the intensity with which an individual internalizes a norm is commensurate
with her discount rate regarding that group. For example, the complete lack of inter-
nalized values exhibited by the sociopath, the consummate opportunist, seems to
validate this claim.210 One would expect an individual with a high discount rate to
show a significant lack of internalization. The fact that a sociopath, who sits at one
far end of this spectrum possessing a complete absence of internalization, also dis-
plays an extremely high discount rate, strongly suggests a correlation between the
two. The extent to which the clinical definition of a sociopath conforms to our def-
inition here of a high discount rate player is striking.
The DSM-IV definition of sociopathy reads: "Antisocial personality disorder
is characterized by a lack of regard for the moral or legal standards in the local cul-
ture."2 1 The salient point is the complete absence of internalization. Characteristics
in respect to this include: a disregard for social norms, rules, and obligations; an
incapacity to experience guilt; a callous unconcern for the feelings of others; a lack
of the capacity for empathy;212 failure to conform to social norms with respect to
lawful behavior; a lack of remorse;213and a tendency to be deceitful and
manipulative214 The Diagnostic Criteria also clearly enumerates characteristics which
we would expect of an individual possessing a very high discount rate, almost read-
ing like a shopping list for this kind of personality: failure to plan ahead; impul-
sivity; reckless; unable to sustain consistent work behavior; failure to honor financial
207. Cialdini & Trost, supra note 103 at 166; See E. Hatfield, J.T Cacioppo & R.L. Rapson, Emotional
Contagion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
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& Social Psychology 415.
209. Posner, supra note 5 at 36.
210. Indeed, the "defining characteristic of sociopaths is their apparent lack of sincere social emotions
... ." Mealey, supra note 82 at 135. In the context of our present discussion sociopathy can thus
be understood as adaptive; it is a viable evolutionary strategy, accounting for its resilient presence
in human psychology.
211. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual ofMental Disorders Dsm-Iv-Tr 701, 4th ed. (Arlington, VA:
American Psychiatric Association, 1994).
212. Robert D. Hare, Stephen D. Hart & Timothy J. Harpur, "Psychopathy and the DSM-IV Criteria
for Antisocial Personality Disorder" (1991) 100 J. Abnormal Psychology 391 at 398.
213. Ibid. at 397.
214. Ibid. at 398.
41
Druzin
obligations; 215 poor behavioral controls;216 irresponsible; incapacity to maintain
enduring relationships; very low tolerance to frustration and a low threshold for
discharge of aggression;217 promiscuous sexual behavior; need for stimulation/prone-
ness to boredom; parasitic lifestyle; lack of realistic, long-term goals.2 8
Other descriptions of antisocial personality indicate an extremely high discount
rate, such as a failure to follow any life plan and unreliability.2 9 Sociopaths do
not perform well in situations that require delayed gratification. 20 The avoidance
of immediate costs is a much stronger motivation than the avoidance of future pun-
ishment.21 Approximately "33% to 80% of the all chronic criminal offenders in
the United Sates are clinical sociopaths." 22  One study found that approximately
75% of the male prison population in Canadian federal prisons met the criteria
for antisocial personality disorder.223 It stands to reason that convicted criminals
having failed to internalize certain core norms of the society they are a part of,
should demonstrate a generally high discount rate. And indeed studies have found
a predictable relationship between criminal behavior and an individual's discount
rate.224 In a sociopath, a high discount rate and lack of internalization characteristics
go hand in hand. Their causal relationship, however, is not conclusive: one could
in theory argue that a lack of internalization causes a high discount rate, or both
are caused by a third factor. However, that there is a correlation between the two
is clear. While a one-to-one correspondence cannot be conclusively established
(this would require an empirical study of the kind suggested above), it is extremely
plausible that there is a connection between the two. Indeed, it points heavily
towards this conclusion.
215. Ibid. at 397.
216. Ibid. at 398.
217. Ibid.
218. Ibid.
219. Hervey Cleckley, Mask of Sanity: An Attempt to Clarify Some Issues about the so-called
Psychopathic Personality, 5th ed. (Augusta, GA: 1988 [1941]) at 338-39.
220. L. Pulkkinen, "The Role of Impulse Control in the Development of Antisocial and Prosocial
Behavior" in D. Olweus, J. Block & M. Radke-Yarrow, eds., Development ofAntisocial and
Pmsocial Behavior: Research, Theories, and Issues (New York: Academic Press, 1985).
221. Mealey, supra note 82 at 166; see also R. Christie & F.L. Geis, Studies in Machiavellianism (New
York: Academic Press, 1970); J. Mccord, "The Psychopath & Moral Development" in WS. Laufer
& J.M. Day, eds., Personality Theory, Moral Development, and Criminal Behavior (Toronto, ON:
Lexington Books, 1983) 357; A. Raine, "Antisocial Behavior and Social Psychophysiology" in
H.L. Wagner, ed., Social Psychophysiology and Emotion: Theory and Clinical Application (New
- York: Wiley, 1988) 231; A. Raine, "Evoked Potentials and Psychopathy" (1989) 8 Int'l J.
Psychophysiology 1; A.E. Forth & R.D. Hare, "The Contingent Negative Variation in
Psychopaths" (1989) 26 Psychophysiology 676.
222. Herbert Gintis et al., "Gene-Culture Coevolution and the Emergence of Altruistic Behaviour in
Humans" in Charles B. Crawford & Dennis Krebs, eds., Foundations ofEvolutionary Psychology
(Florence, KY: Psychology Press 2008) 325. See Mealey, supra note 82 at 133.
223. Correctional Service of Canada, "A Mental Health Profile of Federally Sentenced Offenders"
(1990) 2 Forum on Corrections Research 7. Note that I am here using antisocial personality dis-
order synonymously with sociopathy.
224. Gary S. Becker, Michael Grossman & Kevin M. Murphy, "Rational Addiction and the Effect
of Price on Consumption" (1991) 81 Aea Papers and Proceedings 237; see also Edward L.
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3. Tastes do not undermine signal clarity
From the point of view of the individual actor, however, this complex interplay of
discount rate signals is rarely clearly conceptualized, there is typically no cost-ben-
efit analysis performed; rather such norms are seen through the veil of internalized
values, emotion and morality. We have it exactly backwards: it is not that people
who value charity adopt charitable norms; it is that people with low discount rates
internalize charitable norms (because this signal corresponds with their discount
rate) making them "charitable people." Thus, when evolutionary psychology and
sociobiology speak of the evolutionary advantage of certain emotions, what they
are really speaking of is the evolutionary advantage of certain emotions in that they
aid the individual in playing this all-important signaling game, upon which the entire
enterprise of human cooperation depends, and thus individual survival.
Internalization imperceptibly steers our actions towards the correct sending and
receiving of discount rate signals.
I part company with Posner here. In fact, Posner eschews all "taste" theories
of behavior, arguing that individuals engage in behaviors such as sending gifts, vot-
ing, and racial discrimination in order to emit the correct signals.225 Posner contends
that his signaling model requires that that there be as little ambiguity, or "noise,"
as possible, as ambiguity will undermine the signal.226 Individual tastes therefore
present a problem in Posner's model, as they muddy the clarity of the signal in that
it becomes unclear whether an actor is performing a costly behavior to signal a low
discount rate or merely to satisfy an intrinsic preference: "differences in tastes pro-
duce 'noise'-a costly behavior may reflect a bad type acting to satisfy a preference
rather than a good type signaling a low discount rate. Uncertainty over a person's
tastes creates uncertainty over his type, whatever his behavior."227
I diverge from Posner in that I do not see tastes as-necessarily undermining a
signal's clarity. Indeed, in my model, preferences as they relate to norms are a prod-
uct of these signals. A taste for the signal does not undermine its clarity because
individuals are conditioned to develop a taste for the signal in line with their dis-
count rate; that is, they will internalize the norm. Posner explains that his model
"does not assume that good types have a 'taste' for cooperation or are altruistic."228
I, however, acknowledge the existence of "tastes." Individuals internalize behaviors
in relation to the discount rate signal the act expresses, and doing so develop certain
preferences. Tastes as they are conceptualized here arise in conjunction with nor-
mative signals to blindly guide the individual's behavior, transforming the individual
into an unwitting, but highly proficient player of the signaling game. Individuals
do develop a taste for cooperation or altruism; however, this taste evolves in
response to these signals, not the opposite way around. Individuals with low dis-
count rates are inclined to internalize signals that convey a comparable discount
rate, developing "tastes" for such behaviors. This makes them more prone to engage
225. Posner, supra note 5 at 1-8, 49-50, 122-24, 133.
226. Ibid. at 35.
227. McAdams, supra note 2 at 672.
228. See Posner, supra note 5 at 18.
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in those b aviors, and react "correctly" when perceiving the behavior in others.
Thus, individual preferences do not work to undermine a signal's clarity; they are
in fact a product of the signal.
To be sure, the process is so entrenched we hardly conceptualize these behaviors
as signals at all; rather, for the most part, we send and receive signals all on the
purely internalized level of emotion, value, and morality. We do not, for instance,
see non-cooperative individuals as failing to emit a low discount signal; rather we
see them as being selfish twits, or just plain rude. However, the end result is the
same: they are recognized as unpromising cooperative partners and rejected.
Particular instances of idiosyncratic preferences that coincidentally overlap with
highly specialized signals may still present a problem-refraining from touching
others with one's left hand in Muslim society not out of deference to custom, but
because one has an injured left hand, for example. However, these instances rep-
resent a small minority of signal situations. If it is a norm that members of a certain
group all shave their heads, but I do so only because I want to conceal my baldness,
I will have inadvertently stumbled upon the norm. However, behaviors that allow
for this sort of unintentional signaling too much will not tend to emerge as a norm
in the first place precisely because they lack signal clarity. Developing a taste for
the norm itself, however (for instance, preferring to wear a tie and suit), is not an
issue, because whether an individual develops such a taste will largely depend upon
their discount rate and norm network.
This answers Posner's main complaint regarding normative theories that incor-
porate internalization. Posner laments that such models do not allow us "to make pre-
dictions about when fear of guilt deters people from engaging in certain actions and
when it does not, or what kinds of people feel guilt and what kinds of people do not."'
By tethering Posner's theory to an evolution-based explanation of internalization,
the Expanded Signaling Model allows for such predictions. Guilt, to use Posner's
example, will depend on one's discount rate; low-discount rate types will internalize
norms of groups with which they value cooperation. Posner also charges that, "Most
theories of law and social norms that rely on internalization essentially treat social
norms as exogenous ... if a social norm exists, these theories assume that people have
a 'taste' not to violate it."230 The Expanded Signaling Model assumes the existence
of tastes, but these tastes are a product of the signaling game Posner describes-they
are not exogenous. They arise commensurate with the signaling value that underlies
the behavior, which allows us to predict which types of behaviors will arise and be
internalized and by who. Opportunists (those with high discount rates) will tend to
not develop a taste for behaviors that signal a low discount rate.
4. Opportunism is adaptive
Opportunists do not evolve a predisposition to internalize low discount rate signals
because, fopuch individuals, opportunism represents a viable game strategy. The
229. Ibid. at 43.
230. Ibid. at 44.
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internalization of such behaviors would undermine their ability to deploy such a
strategy. Opportunism too is adaptive."' This accounts for why norms are not per-
fectly internalized across the board. Internalization will correspond with the agent's
strategy (i.e. their discount rate).232 As we discussed earlier, the answer to the puzzle
of "irrational" norm compliance is that norms are internalized. This, however, begs
the question of how a tendency to internalize norms to the point where it is ever
personally disadvantageous could evolve, as it seems that at times a less intense
degree of internalization would be evolutionarily more efficient.' This is a correct
assumption; and indeed this is precisely what we see with individuals who are pre-
disposed to less intense degrees of internalization-i.e. opportunists, or those who
simply lean further that way. Varying degrees of opportunism made possible by
different internalization intensities will confer tremendous benefit upon an indi-
vidual in certain circumstances. Opportunists have learned to take advantage of
these windows of opportunity.
Classifying players as pure opportunists or pure cooperators is oversimplifying
the matter quite a bit; there are many shades in between, with individuals exhibiting
a wide range of discount rates.234 As I mentioned, the same individual might even
display varying discount rates in different situations. Indeed, it is quite rare to find
a pure opportunist (as it is a pure cooperator). Such a player would in fact meet the
clinical description of a sociopath (and a pure cooperator, a saint). What is more
common is to find degrees of opportunism as expressed in higher and higher dis-
count rates.235 The upshot is that the ESS in the society game is not necessarily a
pure strategy like Tit-for-tat, but rather is a mixed strategy,236 where "either individuals
exhibit different behaviors in different circumstances, or the population is composed
of stable proportions of individuals exhibiting different behaviors in all circum-
stances."237 Indeed, selection pressures may induce two or more strategies to stabilize
in some proportion, between or within individuals: Hawk (opportunist) or Dove
231. See L. Mealey, "The Sociobiology of Sociopathy: An Integrated Model" (1995) 18 Behavioral
and Brain Sciences 523 (identifying hypothetical ancestral conditions that would make sociopathy
adaptive); but see Wim E. Crusio, "The Sociopathy of Sociobiology" (1995) 18 Behavioral &
Brain Sciences 552 (charging that Mealey's evolutionary reasoning is logically flawed, and the
import of the cited genetic evidence exaggerated).
232. The gender gap in sociopathy rates is interesting ("3%-4% of the male population and less than
1% of the female population"). See Mealey, supra note 82 at 133. One possible explanation for
this gap is that as the physically stronger gender, males were evolutionarily better positioned to
pursue an opportunist strategy based on aggression. This could go far in explaining the higher
rates of criminality and propensity towards violence found in males.
233. The limits of even deeply internalized norms speaks to this fact. Even the strongest cooperators
may abandon their moral convictions given the right circumstances. Consider situations of mass
panic, or life and death me-or-you situations, where feelings of right and wrong fall by the wayside
to facilitate survival. We even accept this inherent normative flexibility to a degree in others;
for instance, we judge less harshly an individual who takes an innocent life when a gun is held
to their own head. This assumption is so deep-seated, in fact, this is a legal defense, i'). the defense
of necessity. See infra notes 241-42 and accompanying text.
234. Posner, supra note 5 at 19.
235. See Mealey's concept of secondary sociopaths, Mealey, supra note 82 at 163; see also the "Mach"
scale (as in Machiavellian) developed by Christie & Geis, supra note 221.
236. J. Maynard Smith, Evolutionary Genetics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) at 126-36; see
also K. Hawkes, "Sharing and Collective Action" in Eric A. Smith & Bruce Winterhalder, eds.,
Evolutionary Ecology and Human Behavior (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1992) 269 at 281.
237. Nielsen, supra note 76 at 278.
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(Cooperator).238 The varying intensity of internalization will therefore reflect the
different strategies employed by pure opportunists, pure cooperators and every gra-
dation in between. The society game can sustain multiple strategies, thus we see
various levels of norm internalization to support these various strategies. Some
socialites place more importance on correct table manners then others.
Cooperation may emerge as a dominant strategy of sorts; however, with the
growth of this strategy, there will be a tag-along effect where a smaller proportion
of the population can effectively deploy an opportunistic strategy, exploiting the
existence of a cooperation-prone majority. Thus an opportunist strategy "is to be
expected in the population at relatively low frequencies in a demographic pattern
consistent with what we see in contemporary societies. This strategy is also expected
to appear preferentially under certain social, environmental, and developmental
circumstances ... "239 There is considerable research that suggests sociopathy is not
merely learned, but has a substantial genetic basis.2" Put in different terms, a certain
percentage of the population is genetically predisposed towards having a high dis-
count rate, and therefore towards a lack of internalization. Indeed, Linda Mealey
contends that, "there is a genetic predisposition underlying sociopathy which is
normally distributed in the population ."2 And that, "this underlying genetic con-
tinuum is evident in many of us, becoming apparent only at those times when imme-
diate environmental circumstances make an antisocial strategy more profitable than
a prosocial one."242 A population of pure cooperators is therefore difficult to achieve,
as the dominance of this strategy will open the door to a small amount of oppor-
tunism riding upon the coattails of its success (there will, however, exist an optimum
level for opportunism as the parasite cannot kill its host). This would account for
why sociopathy's syndromal structure is stable across cultures though rates vary.243
Evidence indicates that sociopathy is present in most societies and at most points
in historical time.2" Antisocial personality behavior "occurs and is recognized by
every society, no matter what its economic system, and in all eras ... although its
prevalence varies with time and place "24 Changes in certain societies that allow
238. See Smith, supra note 77 at 164-66.
239. Mealey, supra note 82 at 135 (speaking about sociopathy).
240. F. Schulsinger, "Psychopathy: Heredity and Environment" (1972) 1 Int'l J. Mental Health 190;
R.J. Cadoret, "Psychopathology of Adopted-Away Offspring of Biologic Parents with Antisocial
Personality" (1978) 35 Archives of General Psychiatry 176; R.R. Crowe, "An Adoption Study
of Anti-Social Personality" (1974) 31 Archives of General Psychiatry 785; R.J. Cadoret & Cain,
"C. Sex Differences in Predictors of Antisocial Behavior in Adoptees" (1980) 37 Archives of
General Psychiatry 1171; R.J. Cadoret, E. Troughton & T.W. O'Gorman, "Genetic and
Environmental Factors in Alcohol Abuse and Antisocial Personality" (1987) 48 J. Studies on
Alcohol 1; R.J. Cadoret & M.A. Stewart, "An Adoption Study of Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity/
Aggression and their Relationship to Adult Antisocial Personality" (1991) 32 Comprehensive
Psychiatry 73.
241. Mealey, supra note 82 at 135.
242.Ibid.
243. David J. Cooke et al., "Searching for the Pan-Cultural Core of Psychopathic Personality Disorder"
(2005) 39 Personality and Individual Differences 283.
244. David J. Cooke, "Psychopathy Across Cultures" in David J. Cooke, Adelle E. Forth & Robert
D. Hare, eds., Psychopathy: Theory, Research, and Implications for Society (Boston, MA: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 1997) 13 at 14.
245. Robins, Tipp & Przybeck, supra note 196 at 259.
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for a higher rate of viable opportunism might account for the slight variance in rate
of sociopathy between cultures; the respective strategies are locked into slightly
different equilibriums. Nevertheless, there is a "small, cmss-culturally similar, and
unchanging baseline frequency ofsociopaths: a certain percentage of sociopaths
... will always appear in every culture, no matter what the sociocultural condi-
tions."246 A community of cooperators will inevitably yield low frequencies of peo-
ple adopting opportunistic strategies in dynamic equilibrium with shifts in the
environment.247 Thus, we do not see equal levels of signal internalization, but rather
observe its presence to varying degrees.
But even so, overall, the internalization of low discount signals has been selected
for (probably because opportunism as a strategy becomes grossly dysfunctional
if it becomes the majority). We see a very advanced degree of cooperation between
all types. Indeed, even the least cooperative individuals (apart from pure sociopaths)
have internalized the especially strong low-discount signals, such as the interdiction
against murder.
5. Opportunists still know how to play the Game
An important point: the fact that opportunists do not internalize norms as intensely
does not at all imply that they have not learned the signaling game. It is simply
that their evolutionarily stable strategy of opportunism does not call for such inter-
nalization. Internalizing the norm will undermine their ability to employ their strat-
egy when defection opportunities arise. It will be to their advantage, however, to
consciously mimic (along a rational choice model) low discount rate signals when
it serves their purposes. That is, when the costs to do so are not prohibitive in rela-
tion to their limited time horizons.248 It is interesting that sociopaths, pure oppor-
tunists, often display a remarkable intellectual grasp of basic social norms (though
not a genuine belief), commonly including a superficial veneer of sociability and
charm.249 Posner might as well be referring to a sociopath when he writes, "When
the signal consists of conformity to manners, clothing styles, and linguistic trends,
people are vulnerable to the con artist, who exploits people because his unusual
skills and idiosyncratic tastes enable him to mimic signals more cheaply than ordi-
nary bad types."250 Indeed, the sociopath is the consummate rational actor unfettered
by the chains of internalized norms. It is only with these types that a pure rational
actor model really applies, as internalization plays no role in their decisions regard-
ing norm conformity. This is why, as Posner points out, signals are useful only if
they truly create a separating equilibrium through their cost structure.251 While
opportunists have not internalized these norms (or at least not as intensely), they
246. Mealey, supra note 82 at 163.
247.Ibid. at 138.
248. Posner, supra note 5 at 22.
249. Ian Pitchford, "The Origins of Violence: Is Psychopathy an Adaptation?" (2001) 1 The Human
Nature Rev. 28 at 28.
250. Posner, supra note 5 at 22.
251. Ibid. 19-21.
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are still quite able to "read" low-discount signals, as doing so plays a crucial role
in their strategy of exploiting cooperators. Thus opportunists have also "mastered"
the signaling game; they just play a different strategy.
III. This Model as an answer to criticisms of the Signaling Theory of Norms
A rigid insistence upon a rational choice model leaves one with an imperfect frame-
work to work within. The level of "insight that can be squeezed out of a theory which
treats morality, emotions, commitments, and departures from ideals of economic
rationality as peripheral concerns is limited."252 It is incongruent with reality, and
can quickly devolve into downright silliness. As a result, the criticisms of such a
model often equally lack nuance. In reality, both rational choice and approaches that
emphasize internalization have something vital to offer. There is a clockwork-like
rational model underpinning the jumbled mess of emotion and normative belief that
frames our actions-it is the rationality of survival expressed through evolution.
Having fastened internalization to Posner's signaling model, we are in a good position
to reexamine the problem. Armed with this expanded model, let us now turn to some
of the criticisms that have been leveled at Posner's thesis that we have not yet touched
on, and see where we stand. I will deal here primarily with the strongest of these
arguments. To the charge that I answer each of these criticisms with the same expla-
nation: internalization, I would respond that this is exactly the point-once inter-
nalization is brought into the model, these attacks lose all footing, because they stem
entirely from Posner's failure to incorporate internalization into his model.
A. Why signal in private?
A chief objection to Posner's model is that it fails to explain why individuals con-
form to norms in private. Why broadcast a signal if there is no one to receive it?
Kahan makes this charge in relation to tax compliance, arguing that reputational
considerations are undercut by the fact that the release of information regarding
tax compliance is restricted.253 Posner himself acknowledges this conundrum." Neil
Duxbury and Brad Wendel make the same point.255 Wendel,256 as does Duxbury,257
cites voting as an example of norm compliance that apparently stands outside the
reach of Posner's thesis, as it is typically an anonymous act. Duxbury points to
refraining from littering in private,258 tipping,259 and privately held racist views'60
as further illustrations of this hole in Posner's theory.
252. Wendel, supra note 44 at 40.
253. Kahan, supra note 200.
254. Eric A. Posner, "Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance" (2000) 86 Va. L. Rev.
1781 at 1807.
255. See Wendel, supra note 44 at 27; Duxbury, supra note 48 at 725-33.
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258. Ibid. at 725.
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As stated earlier, the answer to why individuals conform to these norms in private
is simple and verifiable through personal experience: individuals conform to these
norms because they have been internalized. Individuals do not cheat on their taxes
because they feel it is the right thing to do, they vote out of patriotic duty, and they
refrain from littering because they respect the environment. This is not an issue
in the Expanded Signaling Model as it acknowledges the reality of internalization
as a chief motivation for norm compliance. Yet, what these critics fail to recognize
is that evolution has conditioned individuals to internalize norms precisely because
doing so enhances the individual's ability to play Posner's signaling game. Posner's
vision of rational choice may be an overgeneralization, however, he is not wrong
in that the signaling game underpins the internalization of norms.
B. Do people consciously signal Discount Rates?
The notion that people follow social norms because they wish to communicate their
discount rate is another target of criticism.26' Wendel argues that it is simply not "rea-
sonable to assume that people who follow the vast majority of social norms do so
because they intend to communicate information about their discount rate." 26 2
"Tastes" often play an important role in influencing an individual's choice of sig-
nals.263 The underlying motivation for norm compliance is invariably grounded in
some perceived value.2" Indeed, individuals are not conscious of social norms as
discount rate signals. The notion that they are is just plain weird. They are not rational
calculations; they are emotional assessments. For the average actor, the two are insep-
arable. We stare perpetually through a prism of emotion. Even when norm confor-
mity is the product of instrumental calculation, the traveler in a foreign culture for
instance, the act is not conceptualized as signaling one's discount rate. Wendel argues
that Posner is essentially blinded "to the varied reasons that people have for following
norms, many of which are not related to their desire to signal discount rate." For
instance, other reasons include "[t]he desire to be "cool," by wearing clothes that
are in fashion, a feeling of solidarity with one's fellows ... or simply mindless con-
formism ... '"65 Wendel points out that other considerations often lie behind flag wav-
ing, for instance, such as patriotism, or even jingoism. 26
Not only does this point not undermine the present model, it is in fact one of
its central contentions. Individuals internalize group norms commensurate with
their discount rate as it relates to that particular group. The internalized norm then
serves as the primary motivation for norm compliance, not a calculated decision
to communicate one's discount rate. People with a low discount rate in relation to
a group that espouses norms of patriotism, will herself tend to be a patriot. A good
261. See Wendel, supra note 44 at 25, 29; Madison, supra note 198.
262. Wendel, supra note 44 at 37.
263. Madison, supra note 198; see also Elmer J. Schaefer, "Predicting Defection" (2002) 36 U. Rich.
L. Rev. 443 at 445-46 (pointing out that people signal to communicate other characteristics besides
discount rates).
264. Wendel, supra note 44 at 29.
265. Ibid. at 25.
266. Ibid. at 34.
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example of this is religious belief. The vast majority of individuals who boast deeply
held religious beliefs subscribe to the very religion in which they were raised to
believe. People tend to prefer the food, clothing, drama, customs, and even political
beliefs of the particular cultural group to which they belong. Our preferences and
beliefs gradually bend to that of the groups with which we value membership.'
In truth, even "mindless conformism" is not that mindless. In this model, tastes
related to norms arise in response to the discount rate that undergird a signal, not
the other way around.
This also answers the related criticism made by Wendel that "observers must
have at least approximate information about the tastes of others, so that they can
filter out the actions resulting from habit, and concentrate solely on costly, observ-
able actions that are related to the actor's discount rate."" Again, the tastes of others
as they relate to normative behavior will reflect their discount rate in relation to
their norm network-business men will tend to prefer the look of neckties, a rapper,
the look of gold chains; a soldier will admire acts of valor in combat, while a
catholic priest will likely highly esteem the act of forgiveness.
C. The Elderly and the Affluent: Groups that should not signal
Posner's strange insistence upon ignoring internalization seems to have invoked
some equally strange criticisms of his theory. For instance, McAdams argues that
Posner's model leads us to the assumption that older people will obey norms less
because "[a]s an individual approaches death, his need for additional cooperative
relations falls."269 Thus, they will "signal less as they approach the end of their
lives."270 As this is clearly not the case, McAdams argues, the signaling model is
flawed. This is a rather unsophisticated argument (in fact, it would seem that the
elderly's need for cooperative relations should actually increase as they are made
more vulnerable by age; if McAdams' point is something akin to the idea of back-
ward induction27' in finitely repeated games-where, knowing the final round of
cooperation precludes future cooperation, the incentive to cooperate vanishes, thus
causing a knock-on effect to the second-to-last round and so on-it is a rather
bizarre contention, as most people do not know exactly when they will die.)
McAdams, however, does level more substantial criticisms at Posner. McAdams
argues that there should be less norm compliance in small, stable, integrated
groups, as there is less need to signal discount rates if one's character is already
well established.272 Mahoney similarly concludes that there should be less signaling
in very small groups (because individuals' discount rates are already well-known),
but also points out that the same holds true for very large groups because any value
267. See supra notes 161-68, 205-08 and accompanying text.
268. Wendel, supra note 44 at 32.
269. McAdams, supra note 2 at 666.
270. Ibid.
271. See R. Luce & H. Raiffa, Games and Decisions: An Introduction and Critical Survey (New York:
John Wiley & Sons, 1957) at 98-99.
272. McAdams, supra note 2 at 664.
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in signaling is undercut but the fact that the chance that one will encounter the
same person again is unlikely.273 Mahoney even argues signaling should be
markedly less present between family members.274 Mahoney also posits that,
according to Posner's model, very wealthy individuals should be less inclined to
engage in signaling, as their wealth and status already serves as a clear indication
of their low-discount rate.275
Again, the Expanded Signaling Model in that it incorporates internalization
deflates these criticisms. The answer is that the signaling game is not this simplistic;
norms are internalized. Normative beliefs are, for the most part, etched into the
individual's core character; they are not simply a game strategy (at least not con-
sciously) to be deployed in certain situations (though this may be true for less inter-
nalized norms, such as formal manners). Thus, the elderly will not abandon their
normative beliefs simply because they have less time left to cash in on the utility
gained form signaling. The fact that, as McAdams writes, "the elderly often lament
the fact that new generations do not respect the norms that the elderly grew up with,
and ... find it impossible to stop engaging in behavior that was once obligated by
norms but is no longer expected or appreciated ..."276 speaks to the fact that these
norms have become deeply internalized over time, and particular to their social
(age) group. The same reason we conform to norms in private applies to interactions
with very small or large groups: the norm is internalized and therefore felt to be
normatively valid. It becomes ingrained through our repeated interactions in mid-
sized groups of individuals with whom we are less acquainted, which is often. This
tendency emerged over the long course of evolution. That said, however, it should
be noted that many social norms (less internalized ones) are actually dispensed with
when interacting with close relations: certain social formalities that do not have
any inherent signaling quality to them, such as an exaggerated attention to polite-
ness. Likewise, large cities of strangers often demonstrate a less vigorous adherence
to norms of politeness. As for Mahoney's point regarding wealthy individuals not
needing to signal, the response is that the tendency to internalize norms is a deeply
entrenched human instinct incrementally wrought by the winnowing force of evo-
lution over inconceivably long stretches of time. It is not something for only the
less affluent.
D. Other more cost-effective ways to communicate Discount Rates
Another criticism of Posner's model centers around the idea that signaling is not
necessarily the most cost effective form of communicating one's discount rate.
McAdams makes this charge,277 as does Wendel.278 McAdams posits that, " ... it
273. Paul G. Mahoney, "Norms and Signals: Some Skeptical Observations" (2002) 36 U. Rich. L.
Rev. 387 at 392.
274.Ibid. at 391.
275. Ibid. at 394.
276. McAdams, supra note 2 at 666.
277.Ibid. at 655.
278. Wendel, supra note 44 at 31.
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is unlikely that people would invest as heavily in signaling as Posner assumes
because there are more direct, less ambiguous ways to attract cooperative part-
ners."' Individuals can, Wendel argues, "order credit reports, use professional net-
works as information-gathering devices, read articles in the trade press about the
stranger ... and in extreme cases, hire private investigators to find out about the
potential cooperative partner's background."280 This argument stems from the sim-
plistic conception of signaling as a conscious undertaking. Again, in the present
model, norm internalization is the product of natural selection. It is an evolved trait,
and has little to do with conscious efforts to investigate someone's discount rate.
People do not consciously search for reliable transaction partners; this is a rather
crude understanding of signaling.
E. Different Incentive Structures convey different signals
Finally, Hardin asks why "radically different incentive structures should be seen
as de facto similar."28' Hardin contrasts cooperation in dyadic relationships with
tax compliance, arguing that the incentives to not cheat are very different.282 "I can-
not imagine," Hardin writes, "that there is any plausible answer to it."283 Indeed,
there is no reason to assume that they are the same. However, they are certainly
not without any connection. Hardin's critique, like Posner's model, errors in that
it is grounded upon the assumption that norm compliance in these two instances
is a purely rational decision. My decision to not cheat you in our dyadic dealings
is to gain benefits from future cooperation; my decision to not cheat on my taxes
is purely out of fear of sanctions. Internalized values, however, often play a strong
role in these decisions, and while cheating on my taxes does not necessarily imply
that I will cheat my close friend (though it does edge me closer in that direction),
not cheating on my taxes (where I could otherwise with impunity) does strongly
suggest that I will not cheat a close friend. If a stranger is willing to steal from her
own mother, it is safe to assume she is willing to steal from you, as this signals
the extent to which the norm has been internalized. Norm compliance in different
contexts are not identical signals, but they often point generally towards an indi-
vidual's relative discount rate.
Conclusion
Those who did not master the signaling game did not survive. Utilizing signals
instinctively aids in survival. Internalization is thus an adaptive quality. It was not
the norms per se that were selected for, it was the ability to signal and recognize
signals instinctively, and this comes in the form of gut moral appraisals of and reac-
279. McAdams, supra note 2 at 655.
280. Wendel, supra note 44 at 31.
281. Hardin, supra note 204 at 1826.
282.Ibid at 1826-27.
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tions to the behavior of others, as well as our own behavior. Through a process of
internalization these signals give rise to a moral universe. An ethical dimension
is superimposed upon our actions. Is this not the defining feature of a norm? Does
this not in fact square better with our empirical experience that normative decisions
are for the most part not performed through the lens of calculated rationality, but
rather from a place of emotional certainty in their ethical legitimacy? The sentiments
that suffuse normative beliefs cannot be denied. And that this hazy emotional land-
scape is not "well enough understood" does not justify formulating an entire theory
that treats it as if it simply were not there.284
Posner's signaling model of norms is a powerful one. Its explanatory reach is
sweeping. Yet it is incomplete as far as it fails to incorporate the reality of inter-
nalization. Internalization, however, can be tethered to Posner's model. Our nor-
mative beliefs rise from an unconscious scramble to secure reliable partnerships
with those around us. The signaling game Posner describes is the rational machinery
that undergirds internalization, infusing a measure of predictability into the entire
process. It reveals an underlying structure to an ostensibly chaotic process. The
model allows us to predict what kind of people will internalize norms and in what
situations. The intensity with which norms are internalized is directly commensurate
with a player's discount rate. The more one values cooperation with a particular
group, the more inclined one is to internalize the norms of that group. We can pre-
dict what behavior regularities are more likely to occur: one's that communicate
a clear signal. Moreover, norms are not treated as exogenous; they arise endoge-
nously, the byproduct of Posner's signaling game. Nevertheless, at its core, a form
of individual rationality is the basis for internalization; there is room for internal-
ization in a law and economics model of social norms. Robert Cooter opines,
"[E]conomic theory cannot explain internalization or predict its occurrence. Filling
this gap requires a theory of endogenous preferences linking economics and devel-
opmental psychology."285 This paper has attempted to provide such a theory.
The internalization of norms forms the purest underpinning of law-its nor-
mative heart. It is why we feel law is just or unjust. Any rational-choice model of
social norms that aspires to theoretical purity by discounting the obvious existence
of the very real emotive side to norms is, in its law and economics puritanical zeal,
in danger of wandering off into the wilderness of pure abstraction. The basic per-
ception of 'right' and 'wrong' implicit in a norm must be incorporated into our
model. The Expanded Signaling Model fleshed out here demonstrates that it is quite
possible to do this while maintaining most of the advantages that a law and eco-
nomics intellectual framework provides.
284. McAdams agrees: "Absent a highly predictive alternative theory, I think one can justify cutting
normative motivations out of the explanation only if one of the following is true: (1) normative
motivations do not actually exist, or (2) normative motivations, while they exist, are unrelated
to the behavior we call norms. Posner explicitly rejects the first proposition, and the second is
simply not tenable." McAdams, supra note 2 at 681.
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